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ABSTRACT
Many current disputes over cultural property resulted from war
confiscations during nineteenth-century international warfare.
India demands the return of the Kohinoor diamond from the United
Kingdom, while China attempts to recover copper animal heads
seized by the British and French armies. Do these states have legal
rights under customary international law (CIL) to recover looted
artifacts today when current conventions are not applied?
Scholars often argue that such claims have no basis in CIL.
However, this article questions their conclusions because they
retroactively apply the current CIL-making approach to determine
whether any CIL rules existed in the nineteenth century. Instead,
this article uses the intertemporal law approach to first identify the
contemporaneous CIL-making criteria in the seventeenth through
twentieth centuries, and then apply these tests to trace the evolution
of the CIL rules against wartime looting of cultural property. I argue
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that CIL has prohibited such practices and provided restitution as
the primary remedy in circumstances of violations since the
nineteenth century. This right to restitution has been established as
a general rule that should be applied to all states rather than only
Western “civilized nations.” Moreover, the passage of over 150
years since the time of removal will not inhibit claims for restitution,
so long as the plundered artifacts still exist and are identifiable. This
article provides an original interpretation of CIL-making in the law
of war with respect to cultural property and paves the legal grounds
for claiming historically looted cultural property today.
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INTRODUCTION

This article discusses whether claiming states have legal rights
in international law to the restitution of cultural properties 1
confiscated during international war in the nineteenth century.2 The
nineteenth century witnessed an immense looting of cultural
artifacts by Western powers from non-Western nations during their
military confrontations. 3 There are many current disputes over
cultural property as a result from these armed conflicts. 4 For
1
Claiming states refers to those states which claim to restitution of cultural
properties plundered during nineteenth-century international warfare. The term
“cultural property” refers to objects that are important to archeology, prehistory,
history, literature, art, or science, on either religious or secular grounds. See
Convention on the Means of Prohibiting and Preventing the Illicit Import, Export
and Transfer of Ownership of Cultural Property art. 1, Nov. 14, 1970, T.I.A.S. No.
83-1202, 823 U.N.T.S. 231; Convention on Stolen or Illegally Exported Cultural
Objects art. 2, June 24, 1995, 2421 U.N.T.S. 457; Council of Europe Convention on
Offences Relating to Cultural Property art. 2(2), May 3, 2017, C.E.T.S. No. 221. For
multiple ways of thinking about the concept of cultural property, see Francesco
Francioni, Public and Private in the International Protection of Global Cultural Goods, 23
EUR. J. INT’L L. 719, 721-22 (2012).
2
This article adopts the term “restitution” as it discusses whether claims have
the legal basis. For the differences between the terms of restitution, repatriation,
and return, see UNESCO, Note on Terminology, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY, at xxiii
(Lyndel V. Prott ed., 2009); CRAIG FORREST, INTERNATIONAL LAW AND THE
PROTECTION OF CULTURAL HERITAGE 140-44 (2010); Wojciech Kowalski, Types of
Claims for Recovery of Lost Cultural Property, in DISPLACED CULTURAL ASSETS: THE
CASE OF WESTERN EUROPE AND THE PROBLEMS OF CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPEAN
COUNTRIES IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY (Piotr Kosiewski & Grazyna Czubek eds.,
2004), reprinted in 57 MUSEUM INT’L, no. 4, 2005, at 85, 85-98.
3 For more information about how Western powers conducted vast plunder
of cultural artifacts from other nations during this period, see generally Margaret
M. Miles, War and Passion: Who Keeps the Art?, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L. 5, 14–17
(2017); MARGARET M. MILES, ART AS PLUNDER: THE ANCIENT ORIGINS OF DEBATE
ABOUT CULTURAL PROPERTY (Cambridge Univ. Press 2008); WILHELM TREUE, ART
PLUNDER (Basil Creighton tran., 1961); WOJCIECH W. KOWALSKI, ART TREASURES AND
WAR (Tim Schadla-Hall ed., 1998); JUDITH GRANT, A PILLAGE OF ART (Roy Publishers,
1968); RUSSELL CHAMBERLIN, LOOT! THE HERITAGE OF PLUNDER (Facts on File 1983);
IVAN LINDSAY, THE HISTORY OF LOOT AND STOLEN ART FROM ANTIQUITY UNTIL THE
PRESENT DAY (Andrews UK Ltd. 2014) (2014) (ebook).
4
See, e.g., William R. Ognibene, Lost to the Ages: International Patrimony and the
Problem Faced by Foreign States in Establishing Ownership of Looted Antiquities,
84 BROOK. L. REV. 605, 605-33 (2019); Alice Lopes Fabris, South-South Cooperation on
the Return of Cultural Property: The Case of South America, 49 CASE W. RSRV. J. INT’L L.
173, 173-96 (2017); Yoshiaki Sato, “Settled Completely and Finally”: A Japanese
Perspective on the Repatriationism of Cultural Property, 10 J.E. ASIA & INT’L L. 197, 197219 (2017); Barbara Plankensteiner, The Benin Treasures: Difficult Legacy and Contested
Heritage, in CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP 133-55 (Brigitta
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example, British armies seized the Kohinoor diamond as a war
trophy from India and presented it to the Queen of England in 1849.5
India has demanded the return of this diamond since its
independence in 1947. 6 This request was firmly refused by
successive British prime ministers.7 As then Prime Minister David
Cameron asserted, “If you say yes to one, you suddenly find the
British Museum would be empty.”8 In another instance, British and
French armies looted countless works of art from China’s Old
Summer Palace during the second Opium War in 1860. 9 These
artifacts were so unique that even French General Baron Montoubon
who participated in this looting amazed, “[N]othing in our Europe
can give an idea of equal luxury.” 10 It is unclear where these
plundered artifacts are currently located. 11 Recently, art dealers
have begun to frequently auction artifacts apparently belonging to
China’s Old Summer Palace. 12 These auctions infuriated many

Hauser-Schäublin & Lyndel V. Prott eds., 2017); Melissa (YoungJae) Koo, Note,
Repatriation of Korean Cultural Property Looted by Japan—Can a Sincere Apology Resolve
the Centuries-Old Korea/Japan Disputes?, 16 CARDOZO J. CONFLICT RESOL. 625, 625–50
(2015).
5
See Satish Jacob, Indian MPs demand Kohinoor’s return, BBC NEWS (Apr. 26,
2000,
17:11
GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/727231.stm
[https://perma.cc/4RRM-5JUB]; Koh-i-Noor: India says it should not claim priceless
diamond from UK, BBC NEWS (Apr. 19, 2016), http://www.bbc.com/news/worldasia-india-36079644 [https://perma.cc/TGT2-4XFU]; Ghoshray, infra note 292, at
749-50.
6 Ghoshray, infra note 292, at 752.
7
Koh-i-Noor, supra note 5.
8
Id.
9
YOUNG-TSU WONG, A PARADISE LOST: THE IMPERIAL GARDEN YUANMING YUAN
139-143 (Univ. Hawai’i Press 2001); Bowlby, infra note 13.
10 WONG, supra note 9, at 139.
11
See Dong Lei (董磊), Ying Paimaihang Qiangxing Paimai Cong Yuanmingyuan
Jielue Wenwu Zhongguo Guojia Wenwuju Qianze (英拍卖行强行拍卖从圆明园劫掠文
物中国国家文物局谴责) [China’s State Bureau of Cultural Property Condemned the
British Auction House to Sell the China’s Old Summer Palace Plunders], CANKAO XIAOXI
( 参 考 军 事 )
[MILITARY
REFERENCE]
(Apr.
11,
2018),
http://www.cankaoxiaoxi.com/mil/20180411/2261289_2.shtml
[https://perma.cc/C3XH-A6PS] (noting that around 1.5 million items were
originally plundered).
12
E.g., Bo Leung, Stolen relics spur strong feelings, CHINA DAILY (June 19, 2018,
15:19), https://www.chinadailyhk.com/articles/47/170/199/1529392506935.html
[https://perma.cc/MC3H-F9TD]; ‘Looted’ Chinese treasures auctioned, BBC NEWS
(May 2, 2000, 14:29 GMT), http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/733543.stm
[https://perma.cc/3P5J-AXBB].

https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/jil/vol42/iss4/3

2021]

The Right to Restitution of Cultural Property Removed

1103

Chinese, which has spurred an ongoing state plan that the Chinese
government attempts to recover these artifacts.13
These disputes are considered some of the most controversial
issues today, which draw extensive discussions. Many authors
argue for restitution under human rights law, emphasizing the
importance of returning significant cultural artifacts to preserve the
identity of peoples and communities.14 Other scholars in favor of
restitution base their arguments on ethical or political grounds, such
as redressing historical wrongs,15 consolidating national identities,16

13
Chris Bowlby, The palace of shame that makes China angry, BBC NEWS (Feb. 2,
2015),
http://www.bbc.com/news/magazine-30810596
[https://perma.cc/GAY7-F8FK] (quoting Niu Xianfeng, General Director of the
National Treasures Fund, which is affiliated with the Chinese Ministry of Culture,
“We’re making a plan to start a series of actions to recover these antiques and get
them back to China.”); see also Leung, supra note 12.
14
See, e.g., Evelien Campfens, The Bangwa Queen: Artifact or Heritage?, 26 INT’L
J. CULTURAL PROP. 75-110 (2019) (“A human rights law approach to restitution
claims can be understood as the acknowledgement of a right to possess, access, or
control certain involuntary lost cultural objects on the grounds of their intangible
heritage interests for specific people . . . .”); Francesco Francioni & Lucas Lixinski,
Opening the Toolbox of International Human Rights Law in the Safeguarding of Cultural
Heritage, in HERITAGE, CULTURE AND RIGHTS 11, 18 (Andrea Durbach & Lucas
Lixinski eds., 2017) (arguing for a recognition of cultural heritage as a “full
member” of the legal framework of human rights); Sarah Fründt, Return LogisticsRepatriation Business: Managing the Return of Ancestral Remains to New Zealand, in
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND CONTESTED OWNERSHIP 178-97 (Brigitta Hauser-Schäublin
& Lyndel V. Prott eds., 2017) (describing New Zealand’s repatriation program, its
implementation and potential improvements). See generally CULTURAL HUMAN
RIGHTS (Francesco Francioni & Martin Scheinin eds., Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2008)
(analyzing the concept of culture and human rights and to assess the impact that
they are having on international law and the development of a coherent category
of cultural human rights).
15
See, e.g., Elazar Barkan, Amending Historical Injustices: The Restitution
of Cultural Property--An Overview, in CLAIMING THE STONES, NAMING THE BONES:
CULTURAL PROPERTY AND THE NEGOTIATION OF NATIONAL AND ETHNIC IDENTITY 16-46
(Elazar Barkan & Ronald Bush eds., 2002); ELAZAR BARKAN, THE GUILT OF NATIONS
308-51 (2000); PATRICK J. O’KEEFE & LYNDEL V. PROTT, 3 LAW AND THE CULTURAL
HERITAGE 839-43 (1984).
16
See O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15; Valdimar Tr. Hafstein & Martin
Skrydstrup, Heritage vs. Property, in THE ROUTLEDGE COMPANION TO CULTURAL
PROPERTY 38, 39 (2017) (regarding “[c]ultural property as a technology of
sovereignty”); Charlotte Edwardes & Catherine Milner, Egypt demands return of the
Rosetta
Stone,
TELEGRAPH
(Jul.
20,
2003),
https://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/1
436606/Egypt-demands-return-of-the-Rosetta-Stone.html
[https://perma.cc/V95J-HLFN] (“[T]hey should volunteer to return the Rosetta
Stone because it is the icon of our Egyptian identity.”).
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or carrying out the necessary steps of decolonization. 17 Some
scholars, however, reject these claims as having weak connections to
the culture of modern states or having merely political or moral
sentiment without a legal basis.18 Many scholars also analyze this
issue in the context of debates about cultural property
internationalism and cultural property nationalism, which address
whether cultural property should be considered a common heritage
belonging to all peoples or a national heritage only belonging to
certain countries.19
This article focuses on the essential legal issue, which has been
rarely discussed, as to whether claiming states have legal rights in
the law of war to recover cultural property confiscated during
nineteenth-century warfare. 20 Although current conventions
dealing with cultural property in the event of armed conflicts cannot
be retroactively applied,21 this limitation does not necessarily impact
17
See A.F. Vrdoljak, International Law, Museums and the Return of Cultural
Objects, in WITNESSES TO HISTORY, supra note 2, at 195; O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note
15.
18 See, e.g., O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15, at 839-41; John Henry Merryman,
Thinking about the Elgin Marbles, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1881, 1915-16 (1985); JAMES
CUNO, WHO OWNS ANTIQUITY? THE BATTLE OVER OUR ANCIENT HERITAGE 21-66
(Princeton Univ. Press 2008).
19
John H. Merryman initiated this debate. See Merryman, supra note 18, at
1901; John Henry Merryman, Two Ways of Thinking about Cultural Property, 80 AM. J.
INT’L L. 831, 831–53 (1986); John Henry Merryman, Cultural Property
Internationalism, 12 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP., 11, 11–39 (2005); John Henry Merryman,
The Nation and the Object, in WHOSE CULTURE? 183-203 (James Cuno ed., 2009). For
recent discussions, see Sabrina Y. Hsieh, The Charitable Deduction and Looting of
Antiquities: A Comparative Approach, 51 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 471, 474-75 (2018); Grant
Strother, Resolving Cultural Property Disputes in the Shadow of the Law, 19 HARV.
NEGOT. L. REV. 335, 357-58 (2014); Raechel Anglin, The World Heritage List: Bridging
the Cultural Property Nationalism-Internationalism Divide, 20 YALE J.L. & HUMANS. 241,
241-75 (2008).
20
Different from this article, many scholars discuss the legal issue of cultural
property in the context of the Nazis looting during the Holocaust era and World
War II. See, e.g., Victoria Bonadies, Taking Greater Responsibility: Austria’s Art
Restitution Act and the Need for Further Reform, 34 AM. U. INT’L L. REV. 671, 671-99
(2019); Jennifer A. Kreder, Analysis of the Holocaust Expropriated Art Recovery Act of
2016, 20 CHAP. L. REV. 1, 1–25 (2017); KEVIN P. RAY, TRANSACTIONS IN ART &
CULTURAL PROPERTY 133-54 (2016).
21
See Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of
Armed Conflict art. 4, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 215 [hereinafter the 1954 Hague
Convention]; The 1954 Hague Convention, supra, Protocol, art. 3, at 358; Protocol
Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I) art. 53, June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 3; Second Protocol to the Hague Convention of 1954 for the
Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict art. 6, Mar. 26, 1999,
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whether there is any equivalent rule of customary international law
(CIL) as discussed by this article. There have been increasing state
practices across the world to return cultural artifacts plundered
during warfare of previous centuries to their countries of origin.22
For example, the United States returned three church bells, which
were seized by American soldiers as war trophies from the
Philippines in 1901, to Philippine authorities in December 2018. 23
These practices raise an important question as to whether they
reflect a basis in CIL for restitution.
It is a well-established CIL rule that “[a] state responsible for an
internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to make
restitution.”24 In this regard, to establish restitution under the law
of war, it is necessary to first inquire whether a CIL rule that
prohibited wartime looting of cultural artifacts (the CIL rule against
plunder) existed in the nineteenth century. Many scholars argue
that the CIL rule against plunder has been established since the end
of the nineteenth century, which was demonstrated by the adoption
of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907.25 These conventions
remarkably showed a general consensus on the law of war, as states
from different continents and political backgrounds sat together to
discuss this matter for the first time ever. 26 Alternatively, many
other scholars claim that this rule was created due to increasing state
2253 U.N.T.S. 172; Convention with Respect to the Laws and Customs of War on
Land art. 56, Jul. 29, 1899, T.S. No. 403 [hereinafter the 1899 Hague Conventions];
Convention Respecting the Laws and Customs of War on Land art. 56, Oct. 18, 1907,
T.S. No. 539 [hereinafter the 1907 Hague Conventions].
22
See infra text accompanying notes 265-281.
23
Julie McCarthy, U.S. Returns Balangiga Church Bells To The Philippines After
More Than A Century, NPR NEWS (Dec. 11, 2018, 5:05 AM ET),
http://www.npr.org/2018/12/11/675505073/after-117-years-balangiga-bellswill-be-returned-to-the-philippines [https://perma.cc/98VM-ZJ7D].
24
Infra note 42, at art. 35.
25
Charles de Visscher argued that the doctrine of international law against
plundering cultural property was accepted by all nations during the two Hague
Conventions in 1899 and 1907. Charles de Visscher, International Protection of Works
of Art and Historic Monuments, DOCUMENTS & STATE PAPERS OF JULY 1949, reprinted in
8 INT’L INFO. & CULTURAL SERIES 821, 827–28 (1949). Merryman argued that
international law prohibited plundering since the late nineteenth century. See JOHN
HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E. ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS, AND THE VISUAL ARTS 14 (2d ed.
1987). Wayne Sandholtz argues that this legal norm was transmitted into general
international law at the end of the nineteenth century due to the adoption of the
Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907. See WAYNE SANDHOLTZ, PROHIBITING
PLUNDER, HOW NORMS CHANGE 39-45, 67-70 (Oxford Univ. Press 2007).
26 Andrew Webster, Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), in THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF
WAR (Gordon Martel ed., 2012).
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practices to protect cultural artifacts in the context of the two World
Wars.27 Moreover, widespread participation of states in returning
looted cultural artifacts to their countries of origin occurred after the
end of World War II.28 In light of this history, these scholars thus
agree that the law of war in the nineteenth century did not forbid
the looting of cultural artifacts.29
These scholars clearly make their arguments by applying the
two-element approach to identify CIL, which requires general state
practice and the opinio juris (or acceptance as law).30 General state
practice must be “sufficiently widespread and representative, as
well as consistent.”31 Opinio juris refers to a feeling or belief that
states have legal rights or obligations to perform certain practices.32
27
Patrick J. O’Keefe, who has studied the return of dispossessed cultural
property for more than forty years, observes that the principle against wartime
looting was established in the early twentieth century. See PATRICK J. O’KEEFE,
PROTECTING CULTURAL OBJECTS: BEFORE AND AFTER 1970 3-4 (Inst. Art & L. 2017)
(outlining different treaties on wartime looting in the early twentieth century).
Wojciech Kowalski, who has given contributions to addressing the international
right to restitution as well as its principles, argues that this right was fully
established after World War I. KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 81. For more scholars
who follow their ideas, see Duncan Chappell & Saskia Hufnagel, The Gurlitt Case:
German and International Responses to Ownership Rights in Looting Cases, in CULTURAL
PROPERTY CRIME 221-22 (Joris D. Kila & Marc Balcells eds., 2014); Karen Goepfert,
The Decapitation of Rameses II, 13 B.U. Int’l L.J. 503, 520-25 (1995).
28
See infra text accompanying notes 192-220.
29
See supra notes 25, 27 and accompanying text; MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra
note 3, at 349-53.
30
For the two-element approach, see Statute of the International Court of
Justice, art. 38(1)(b), June 26, 1945, T.S. No. 993 [hereinafter the ICJ Statute]; Int’l
Law Comm’n, Draft Conclusions on Identification of Customary International Law
with Commentaries, Conclusion 2, U.N. Doc. A/73/10, at 124 (2018) [hereinafter
the ILC].
31
ILC, supra note 30, at 135; cf. North Sea Continental Shelf (Ger./Den. v.
Ger./Neth.), Judgment, 1969 I.C.J. 3, ¶73 (Feb. 20):
With respect to the other elements usually regarded as necessary before
a conventional rule can be considered to have become a general rule of
international law, . . . a very widespread and representative
participation in the convention might suffice of itself, provided it
included that of States whose interests were specially affected.
See also Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v.
U.S.), Judgment, 1986 I.C.J. 14, ¶186 (June 27) (“The Court does not consider that,
for a rule to be established as customary, the corresponding practice must be in
absolutely rigorous conformity with the rule.”).
32
See, e.g., SS. Lotus (Fr. v. Turk.), Judgment, 1927 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 10, at 28
(Sept. 7); North Sea Continental Shelf, supra note 31, at ¶77; Jurisdictional
Immunities of the State (Ger. v. It.: Greece Intervening), Judgment, 2012 I.C.J. 99,
122, ¶55 (Feb. 3); Right of Passage over Indian Territory (Port. v. India), Judgment,
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However, this two-element test only represents our current
understanding of how CIL is formulated and ascertained. 33
Applying the current approach to examine the formation of CIL
rules in earlier centuries is itself against the principle of nonretroactivity. Non-retroactivity is well recognized as the basic
principle of law requiring the rules of law “not having effect from a
date before it was made.”34 This principle requires an intertemporal
law approach to examine the legality of CIL rules “by the legal
standards valid at the time of its enactment.” 35 In this respect,
whether or not a nineteenth-century CIL rule existed should be
determined by the contemporaneous nineteenth-century approach.
However, it is unclear what the legal tests were to establish and
develop CIL rules at that time.36 This ambiguity makes the views of
those scholars who claim that the law of war in the nineteenth
century did not prohibit the looting of cultural artifacts
questionable.37
This article uses the intertemporal law approach to first explore
the CIL-making criteria of the seventeenth through twentieth
centuries and then apply these tests to trace the evolution of the CIL
rule against plunder and the CIL right to restitution as the legal

1960 I.C.J. 6, 9 (Apr. 12) (dissenting opinion by Chagla, J.); ILC, supra note 30,
Conclusion 9 and Commentary (2), at 138.
33
This current approach can only be traced to Article 38 of the Statute of
Permanent Court of International Justice of 1920. Statute of the Permanent Court
of International Justice art. 38, Dec. 16, 1920, 6 L.N.T.S. 389.
34 Non-retroactivity, TRANSLEGAL, https://www.translegal.com/legal-englishdictionary/non-retroactivity [https://perma.cc/UHD2-NMDS].
35
Markus Kotzur, Intertemporal Law, in MAX PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 5 (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed, 2008), MPEPIL 1322,
https://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY] (last visited Mar. 10,
2020).
36
The contemporary literature contains almost no analysis about legal tests
prior to the current approach. However, there are other understandings of the
formation of CIL rules in history than the intertemporal law approach. See, e.g., B.
S. Chimni, Customary International Law: A Third World Perspective, 112 AM. J. INT’L L.
1, 1-46 (2018); J. Patrick Kelly, Customary International Law in Historical Context, in
REEXAMINING CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW 47, 47-85 (Brian D. Lepard ed., 2017).
37
Contrary to these scholars, Stanislaw E. Nahlik, a prominent contemporary
international law jurist, stated that the plunder of cultural property was prohibited
by the law of war in the nineteenth century, but he did not provide analysis to his
argument. See Stanislaw E. Nahlik, International Law and the Protection of Cultural
Property in Armed Conflicts, 27 HASTINGS L.J. 1069, 1071-72 (1976).
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remedy.38 These analyses reveal that “the rule against such plunder
was indeed founded in the laws and customs of war in the
eighteenth century, became well established in the nineteenth
century, and further developed in the twentieth century.”39 On this
basis, this article finds that the CIL right to restitution has been
established as the primary remedy over compensation for violations
of the CIL rule against plunder since the nineteenth century. It
further argues that the right to restitution has been established as a
general CIL rule that should be applied to all nations. Moreover, the
passage of over one and a half centuries does not bar this right, so
long as plundered artifacts still exist and are identifiable. States that
were plundered in the nineteenth-century war therefore have strong
legal grounds for claiming restitution.
This article is divided into eight parts beginning with the
introduction. Part II analyzes the jurisprudence of restitution as a
legal remedy in international law. Part III explores the legal tests for
identifying CIL rules during the seventeenth through twentieth
centuries and then applies these tests to examine the evolution of the
CIL rule against plunder. Part IV investigates how restitution has
38
Although many scholars study the evolution of the rule that protects
cultural property during armed conflicts, the question remains as to when and how
this rule has been established in CIL. For examples of scholarship as such, see
Rüdiger Wolfrum, Cultural Property, Protection in Armed Conflict, in MAX PLANCK
ENCYCLOPEDIAS OF INTERNATIONAL LAW (Rüdiger Wolfrum ed., 2010), MPEPIL 278,
https://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY] (last visited Mar. 10,
2020); Patty Gerstenblith, Protecting Cultural Heritage in Armed Conflict: Looking Back,
Looking Forward, 7 CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. 677, 677-708 (2009);
SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25; Sandholtz, infra notes 157 and 193; Patrick J. Boylan, The
Concept of Cultural Protection in Times of Armed Conflict: From the Crusades to the New
Millennium, in ILLICIT ANTIQUITIES: THE THEFT OF CULTURE AND THE EXTINCTION OF
ARCHAEOLOGY 43-108 (Neil Brodie & Kathryn Walker Tubb eds., 2003); ROGER
O’KEEFE, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY IN ARMED CONFLICT 5-91 (2006);
FORREST, supra note 2, at 63-73; JIRI TOMAN, THE PROTECTION OF CULTURAL PROPERTY
IN THE EVENT OF ARMED CONFLICT 4-5 (Dartmouth Publ’g Co. 1996); StanislawEdward Nahlik, Protection of Cultural Property, in INTERNATIONAL DIMENSIONS OF
HUMANITARIAN LAW 203-15 (UNESCO 1986); M. Cherif Bassiouni, Reflections on
Criminal Jurisdiction in International Protection of Cultural Property, 10 SYRACUSE J.
INT’L L. & COM. 281, 287-97 (1983); O’KEEFE & PROTT, supra note 15; de Visscher, supra
note 25; Alan Marchisotto, The Protection of Art in Transnational Law, 7 VAND. J.
TRANSNAT'L L. 689, 689-724 (1973); Lakshmikanth Penna, Protection of Cultural
Property During Armed Conflict, in SHELTER FROM THE STORM: DEVELOPMENTS IN
INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN LAW (Maley William ed. 1997); Andrea Cunning,
The Safeguarding of Cultural Property in Times of War & Peace, 11 TULSA J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 211, 211-23 (2003); Joshua E. Kastenberg, The Legal Regime for Protecting
Cultural Property During Armed Conflict, 42 A.F.L. REV. 277, 280-89 (1997).
39
Yue Zhang, Customary International Law and the Rule Against Taking Cultural
Property as Spoils of War, 17 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 943, 943 (2018).
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been established as the primary remedy for the breach of the CIL
rule against plunder. Part V discusses whether the CIL right to
restitution has been a general CIL rule that should be applied to all
nations since the nineteenth century. Part VI focuses on whether the
passage of time inhibits the claims of restitution. Part VII inquires
as to the limitations to enforcing restitution, which requires that the
objects for restitution still exist and are identifiable, with a practical
consideration of necessity that should be determined by claiming
states. This article concludes by bringing together the results of my
analysis in Part VIII. This article provides an original interpretation
of CIL-making in history and the law of war in the protection of
cultural property. Applying these conclusions to current disputes
would thus ultimately transform the current debates about
restitution and retention of displaced cultural property.
II.

RESTITUTION IN GENERAL INTERNATIONAL LAW

This Part analyzes the jurisprudence of restitution as a state
responsibility in current international law. It then traces the
historical development of restitution to examine whether restitution
was also established as the primary remedy for states’ international
wrongful acts starting in the seventeenth century, a period deemed
to be the beginning of the modern international law era.
a. The Jurisprudence of Restitution Under Current International Law
According to Black’s Law Dictionary, one of primary meanings
of restitution refers to “return or restoration of some specific thing
to its rightful owner or status.” 40 Under international law,
restitution defines a state’s responsibility of reparation that arises
from wrongful acts that states have committed.41 The International
Law Commission (ILC)’s Articles on State Responsibility represent
a great achievement by the Commission that codifies the law of state

Restitution, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (11th ed. 2019), Westlaw.
JAMES CRAWFORD, THE INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMISSION’S ARTICLES
STATE RESPONSIBILITY 213 (2002); see ILC U.N. Doc. A/56/10, infra note 42.
40
41
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responsibility.42 According to Article 35, restitution means “to reestablish the situation which existed before the wrongful act was
committed.”43 Article 36(1) confirms that restitution serves as the
primary remedy of reparation while state responsibility for
compensation would be made only if “such damage is not made
good by restitution.”44 The obligation to perform restitution could
be precluded if the objects that would be subject to restitution are
materially impossible to return. 45 As the ILC’s commentary to
Article 35 explains, restitution serves as the first form of reparation
because “restitution most closely conforms to the general principle
that the responsible State is bound to wipe out the legal and material
consequences of its wrongful act by re-establishing the situation that
would exist if that act had not been committed.”46
The reasoning behind requiring restitution over compensation
as the primary remedy of reparation is based on the Factory at
Chorzów case of 1928. 47 In this case, the Permanent Court of
International Justice first provided a general definition of
reparation:
The essential principle contained in the actual notion of an
illegal act . . . is that reparation must, as far as possible, wipe
out all the consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have existed if that
act had not been committed.48
The court then concluded that it was a basic rule of international law
that states were liable for restitution due to violations of
international law, and compensation should be made only if
restitution was not possible.49

42 Int’l Law Comm’n, Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, U.N. Doc.
A/56/10 (2001), reprinted in [2001] 2 Y.B. INT’L L. COMM’N 96-97, U.N. DOC
A/CN.4/SER.A/2001/Add.1.
43
Id. at art. 35.
44
See id. at art. 36(1) (establishing that the State should resort to restitution
before compensating for the damage).
45
Id. at art. 35(1).
46
Id. at art. 35; CRAWFORD, supra note 41.
47 Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 42, at 91.
48 Factory at Chorzów (Ger. v. Pol.), Judgment, 1928 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 17, at
47 (Sept. 13).
49
Id.
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b. Tracing the Jurisprudence of Restitution in the History of
International Law
Many authorities refer to the Factory at Chorzów case when
discussing the legitimacy of restitution in international law,50 as if
the legal rules for restitution were founded in general international
law starting in this case. However, restitution was established as a
legal remedy not only in Roman law,51 but also in the practices of
warfare in ancient Roman era. As Pierino Belli, a classical
international law writer observed, restitution had been one of main
themes surrounding war and peace since the Ancient Greek and
Roman eras. 52 Hugo Grotius, who is often referred to as the
founding father of international law beginning in the seventeenth
century, listed many instances illustrating that Roman conquerors
restored spoils of war to conquered parties when such looting
violated the justice of war.53
Restitution was well established in the law of war during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As Belli stated, “[P]eace
restores everything to its original condition (so that what war has
taken away is restored forthwith by peace).” 54 Restitution was
prevalent especially when the capture of property was made
contrary to just war or just cause.55 As Grotius wrote, “What [wa]s
done in an unjust war [wa]s unjust in itself,” and thus “what [wa]s
50
See CRAWFORD, supra note 41, at 213; Attila Tanzi, Restitution, in MAX
PLANCK ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW para. 1 (Rüdiger Wolfrum
ed., 2013), MPEPIL 1094, http://opil.ouplaw.com [https://perma.cc/Z6E8-29JY]
(last visited Mar. 10, 2020). See generally Christine Gray, The Choice Between
Restitution and Compensation, 10 EUR. J. INT’L L. 413 (1999) (discussing reference to
the Factory at Chorzow case by the International Court of Justice in various cases
involving restitution).
51
Restitution, supra note 40.
52
See 2 PIERINO BELLI, A TREATISE ON MILITARY MATTERS 8 (James Brown Scott
ed., Herbert C. Nutting trans., 1936) (noting that restitution was a frequent cause of
wars).
53
3 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 1419 n.2, 1513-15 (Richard
Tuck & Knud Haakonssen eds., Liberty Fund, Inc. 2005) (recalling “Macrinus
restored the Prisoners and Booty to the Parthians, because the Romans had broken
the Treaty without Cause.”).
54
2 BELLI, supra note 52, at 284.
55
1 HUGO GROTIUS, THE RIGHTS OF WAR AND PEACE 396, n.15 (Richard Tuck &
Knud Haakonssen eds., Liberty Fund 2005) (according to Saint Austin, “the
Restitution of what was taken away unjustly” was deemed a well-accepted cause
to start a just war, which was also written in the Canon law.).
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taken away by an Enemy in an unjust War, [should] be restored.”56
As Samuel Pufendorf, another classical international law writer in
the seventeenth century, argued, “Whoever himself takes by unjust
violence and keeps another’s property is bound to restore it.” 57
Christian Wolff, who was another classical international law writer
in the eighteenth century, likewise held, “[W]ho wages an unjust
war is bound to restore property taken by force from another whose
war is just.”58
Restitution was also prevalent in early common law precedents,
especially when the object was irreplaceable due to its historical and
cultural significance. In the Pusey v. Pusey case of 1684, England’s
High Court of Chancery issued the order to restore an ancient horn
to the plaintiff who inherited the horn from his ancestors.59 This case
suggests that monetary compensation could not replace restitution
when the objects in dispute had unique historical and cultural
significance. Likewise in the Falcke v. Gray case of 1859, in which the
High Court of Chancery was requested to order the specific
performance of a contract to purchase two china jars,60 the court
noted, compensation would not be a satisfactory remedy for nonperformance, because the articles for purchase were of “unusual
beauty, rarity and distinction.” 61 Although these cases were not
related to states’ claims, these decisions reflected the jurisprudence
of restitution as the primary remedy over compensation, especially
when cultural artifacts were the objects that were subject to
restitution. This jurisprudence also explains why CIL has adopted
restitution as the primary remedy for the violations of the rule of the
law of war that prohibits the looting of cultural property, as
discussed by the following sections.

3 GROTIUS, supra note 53, at 1416, 1512.
2 SAMUEL PUFENDORF, ELEMENTORUM JURISPRUDENTIAE UNIVERSALIS LIBRI
DUO [TWO BOOKS ON THE ELEMENTS OF THE UNIVERSAL LAW] 266, at para. 314 (27)
(James Brown Scott ed., William Abbott Oldfather trans., 1931).
58
2 CHRISTIAN WOLFF, JUS GENTIUM METHODO SCIENTIFICA PERTRACTATUM [THE
LAW OF NATIONS ACCORDING TO THE SCIENTIFIC METHOD] 407 (James Brown Scott ed.,
Joseph H. Drake trans., 1934).
59
Pusey v. Pusey (1684) 23 Eng. Rep. 465, 465; 1 Vern. 272, 273.
60
See Falcke v. Gray (1859) 62 Eng. Rep. 250, 252-55; 4 Drewry. 651, 656-65
(noting that usually the court would issue specific performance because the object
at issue was so rare). The court ultimately decided to not award specific
performance for contractual reasons. Id. at 255; 4 Drewry. at 665.
61
Id. at 252; 4 Drewry. at 658.
56
57
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THE EVOLUTION OF THE CIL RULE AGAINST WARTIME
PLUNDER OF CULTURAL PROPERTY

This part first explores the different legal tests for identifying
CIL rules during the seventeenth through twentieth centuries and
then applies these tests to illustrate how the CIL rule against such
plunder was indeed founded in the laws and customs of war in the
eighteenth century, became well established in the nineteenth
century, and was further developed in the twentieth century.
a. The Formation of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Seventeenth
and Eighteenth Centuries
Plundering an enemy’s property had long been justified by the
motto “to the victor belong the spoils” in early history.62 However,
no one can deny that such practices are absolutely prohibited by
international law today. 63 Thus, it is clear that there has been a
substantial change in the legal treatment of cultural artifacts during
warfare over time. As this section shows, this shift indeed occurred
during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries under natural law
jurisprudence.
i.

The Approach to Identify the Formation of CIL Rules

The customary law of nations during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries was not exactly identical to what we currently
understand of CIL. 64 The law of nations, a common term for
62

(1977).

LEONARD D. DUBOFF & SALLY H. CAPLAN, THE DESKBOOK

OF

ART LAW 129

63
See generally supra notes 21 (describing current conventions dealing with
cultural property in the event of armed conflicts), 38 (describing the scholarship on
the evolution of the rule that protects cultural property during armed conflicts); cf.
U.N. Secretary-General, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Paragraph 2 of
Security Council Resolution 808, U.N. Doc. S/25704, annex, Statute of the
International Tribunal art. 3(d) (May 3, 1992) (subjecting prohibited seizures to
prosecution).
64
The customary law of nations as a main source of international law was not
as uniformly categorized as the CIL is today. Instead, different writers framed the
customary law of nations in different categories. For instance, Grotius divided the
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international law at that time, was framed according to natural law
philosophy, which deduced legal rules from the presumed supreme
legal authority on the basis of law and morality.65 Under natural
law, the law of nations adopted different sources of law than what
we have today.66 First, the highest source of the law of nations was
the writings of classical international law writers in their respective
times. 67 The significance for individual writers in identifying
general international law is enormously different from today, as
writings of international law publicists are now only considered as
a “subsidiary means” to this end.68 Second, usage was considered
the main body of the law of nations during this period. As the
celebrated British Judge Lord Stowell observed in the Flad Oyen case
of 1799, “A great part of the law of nations stands on [the usage and
practice of nations].”69 This proof value was influenced mostly by
the British legal system, in which usages alone were able to create

law of nations into natural law and voluntary law, the latter category including the
customary law of nations. 1 GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 147-60. de Vattel, on the
other hand, classified the law into four categories—the necessary, the voluntary,
the conventional, and the customary law of nations. EMER DE VATTEL, THE LAW OF
NATIONS lviii §7, lxv-lxvi §27, (Joseph Chitty ed., Liberty 1844).
65
See T.J. LAWRENCE, PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 442-43 (Hans Kelson
& Robert Tucker eds., 2d ed. 1966); BIRGIT SCHLUTTER, DEVELOPMENTS IN CUSTOMARY
INTERNATIONAL LAW 46 (Martinus Nijhoff Pub. 2010).
66
The international community has established a doctrinal system to ascertain
the sources of international law since the beginning of the twentieth century, which
categorizes the law as international conventional law, CIL, and general principles
of law. See, e.g., Statute of the Permanent Court of International Justice, supra note
33, art. 38 (1). The statute of ICJ accepted this doctrinal system of the sources with
slight variations in expression. See, e.g., The ICJ Statute, supra note 30, art. 38 (1).
67
See HENRY SUMNER MAINE, INTERNATIONAL LAW 14 (London, John Murray,
1888); GEORGE GRAFTON WILSON & GEORGE FOX TUCKER, INTERNATIONAL LAW 40-41
(5th ed. 1910) (“the writings of the great publicists . . . as the highest source of
authority . . . in the domain of international law”); ARCHER POLSON, PRINCIPLES OF
THE LAW OF NATIONS 20-21 (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson, 1853) (detailing the
authority of text writers “whenever they record the usages and practice of
nations”).
68 The ICJ Statute, supra note 30, art. 38(1)(d).
69
The “Flad Oyen” (1799) 165 Eng. Rep. 124, 126; 1 C. Rob. 134, 139; see also
HENRY WHEATON & COLEMAN PHILLIPSON, WHEATON’S ELEMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW 5-6 (5th ed. 1916). Twiss also quoted this statement in his treatise of the law of
nations in the nineteenth century. TRAVERS TWISS, TWO INTRODUCTORY LECTURES ON
THE SCIENCE OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 52 (London, Longman, Brown, Green, and
Longmans, 1856).
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legal rules.70 The establishment of usages required uniform acts by
nations with a long period of observation.71
Instead of a universal application, usages were usually valid
only among nations that actually engaged in certain practices on a
reciprocal basis.72 This feature explains why some customary rules
were even optional and allowed states to unilaterally withdraw.73
However, mandatory customary rules did exist during the
seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and they had a universal
application under natural law theory. Such mandatory customary
rules required not only usages but also a subjective element, i.e., the
law of nature, which was based on justice and reasonableness and
could be proved by the use of reason.74 The law of nature indeed
constituted the fundamental basis of natural law jurisprudence and
made all rules of the law of nations legally binding.75 The validity
of mandatory CIL rules thus had to be tested by the law of nature.76
Accordingly, the law of nations during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries required two elements to identify mandatory
CIL rules under natural law jurisprudence: usages on the basis of
long-established and uniform practices, and the law of nature to
validate those usages. This observation was well recognized in the
Silesian Loan case of 1753, as the British government defined the idea
of “[t]he Law of Nations, founded upon Justice, Equity,
Convenience and the Reason of the Thing, and confirmed by long

70
See ROBERT MORDEN, GEOGRAPHY RECTIFIED: OR, A DESCRIPTION OF THE
WORLD 22 (1688) (“The Common Law of England is a Collection of the General
Common Custom, and Usages of the Kingdom.”); see also Custom, OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
Such importance is quite different from our
understanding today that regards usage as merely the material element of CIL and
requires state consent or opinio juris to be legally binding. See the ICJ Statute, supra
note 30, art. 38 (1)(b).
71
As Suarez observed, usages among nations were binding in the intercourse
among them, and such usages needed to be long observed and uniformly acted
upon. TWISS, supra note 69, at 11.
72
DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at lxv §25.
73 Cf. William S. Dodge, Withdrawing from Customary International Law: Some
Lessons from History, 120 YALE L.J. ONLINE 169, 171-75 (2010),
http://yalelawjournal.org/forum/withdrawing-from-customary-internationallaw-some-lessons-from-history [https://perma.cc/LU5N-7NLD].
74
See id.; 1 GROTIUS, supra note 55, at 147-60 (describing how different legal
disciplines are tested by the law of nature).
75
SCHLÜTTER, supra note 65; PRINCIPLES OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, supra note 65.
76
See WM. OKE MANNING, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF NATIONS 80 (London,
S. Sweet 1839).
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Usage.” 77 This statement was well recognized among European
nations “as one of the ablest expositions of international law” at that
time.78
ii.

The Established CIL Rule Against Plunder

Looting an enemy’s cultural artifacts had been a common
practice since at least the Roman era, long justified by the traditional
right of conquest.79 However, sovereigns in Europe began to stop
plundering each other’s cultural artifacts starting with the Peace of
Westphalia of 1648.80 Moreover, the looting of cultural artifacts was
abandoned almost entirely during the eighteenth century.81 These
uniform practices among European sovereigns, which continued for
nearly one and a half centuries, strongly suggested that a new usage
had been established to oblige parties engaging in warfare not to
plunder cultural artifacts. 82 It is interesting to question why this
shift in practices of warfare occurred during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries. It is not likely that the abstention from looting
resulted from the lack of interest in looting or lack of capacity to
77
Arnold D. McNair et al., The Debt of International Law in Britain to the Civil
Law and the Civilians, 39 PROBS. PUB. & PRIV. INT’L L. 183, 192 (1953). This opinion
was especially significant for demonstrating the relationship between usage and
the law of nature. Id. at 194-95. The British Crown acquired this opinion from its
officers including Lord Mansfield, who was deemed one of the most celebrated
judges on the English bench. Id.; BRIERLY, infra note 99. Opinions as such were
usually provided as confidential advice to the Crown. McNair et al., supra, at 19495. However, this opinion was written in reply to the Prussian statement of this
case, and this made it publishable among other nations in Europe. Id.
78
1 ROBERT PHILLIMORE, COMMENTARIES UPON INTERNATIONAL LAW 55, para.
XX (Philadelphia, T. & J. W. Johnson 1854).
79
See de Visscher, supra note 25, at 823; MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3,
at 13, 52; MERRYMAN, supra note 25, at 13; Stephan Wilske, International Law and the
Spoils of War: To the Victor the Right of Spoils?, 3 UCLA J. INT’L L. & FOREIGN AFFS. 223,
242-43 (1998) (describing the Roman Empire’s legal system regarding “spoils of
artworks.”); SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 32-34.
80
See Penna, supra note 38, at 258; TREUE, supra note 3, at 162 (noting lack of
large-scale art plundering in Germany and Austria since 1648); Merryman, infra
note 173, at 325; de Visscher, supra note 25, at 824; Nahlik, supra note 38, at 203.
81
See de Visscher, supra note 25, at 824; PERCY BORDWELL, THE LAW OF WAR
BETWEEN BELLIGERENTS 62 (1908) (describing the “respect shown for private
property” by the British conduct during the War of 1812); cf. TREUE, supra note 3, at
162 (noting lack of big-scale plundering of art in Germany and Austria since the
sack of Prague).
82
Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 32 (noting the abandonment from looting
“starting with the Peace of Westphalia in 1648”).
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loot. 83 Indeed, this new usage resulted from a change in the
perception of justice and reasonableness that restricted the
traditional right of conquest.84
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, many classical
international law writers sought to limit the damages of war and
thus placed more restrictions on the right of conquest.85 According
to these jurists, it was just war and just cause that determined the
treatment of an enemy’s property.86 These jurists further related just
cause to military necessity in the determination of what type of
property could be seized. 87 Sacred objects and works of art
especially were considered exceptions to the rules regarding the
spoils of war. As Grotius emphasized, it was not necessary to use
force upon artifacts that posed no danger to an army in a war but
actually honored human society, such as temples and sacred
objects. 88 de Vattel further articulated that objects that did not
increase the enemy’s strength but honored human society should be
excluded from spoils of war, including temples, tombs, public
buildings, and all remarkable works of art.89
Grotius’ and de Vattel’s reasoning about the treatment of
cultural artifacts during warfare reflected an updated
understanding of the law of nature regarding the right of conquest.
These writers’ opinions were rooted in the development of civil
society, which increasingly appreciated special values of cultural
artifacts during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. As early
as 70 BCE, the influential Roman jurist Marcus T. Cicero developed
a philosophy about the fate of works of art when he prosecuted
Governor Verres, who abused his authority by plundering artistic
Id. at ¶ 33.
Id.
85
See SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 35-44 (illustrating the rise of art’s status
during the Renaissance and how writers sough to protect art from harms of wars).
86
HUGO GROTIUS, COMMENTARY ON THE LAW OF PRIZE AND BOOTY 89 (Martine
Julia van Ittersum ed., Liberty Fund 2006); see 2 BELLI, supra note 52, at 131 (stating
that "cities ought not to be plundered except for some great wrong and crime.");
WOLFF, supra note 58, at 402 §778.
87
2 ALBERICO GENTILI, DE JURE BELLI LIBRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ON THE LAW OF
WAR] 270, 275 (Clarendon Press 1933); PUFENDORF, supra note 57, at 166, 245, 256;
WOLFF, supra note 58, at 426-27 §§823-825 (discussing the “allowable destruction”
in just wars).
88
2 HUGO GROTIUS, DE JURE BELLI AC PACIS LIBRI TRES [THREE BOOKS ON THE
LAW OF WAR AND PEACE] 751, para. V (Francis W. Kelsey trans., 1925) (articulating
when “devastation should be refrained” during war).
89
DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at §168 (noting the justice and power of
distributive justice).
83

84
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treasures.90 Cicero strongly emphasized the cultural value of works
of art instead of merely focusing on their economic or religious
value. 91 Moreover, Cicero viewed these artifacts as absolutely
essential to the life of a given people, arguing that cultural artifacts
should be preserved in their original surroundings.92 Cicero’s views
did not draw much attention in his own time. However, in later
centuries, the Renaissance enhanced the cultural impact of art in the
development of humanism and thus ignited people’s appreciation
for cultural artifacts. 93 Cicero’s writings about the indisputable
value of cultural artifacts to their territories of origin were then
revived, serving as a vital precedent in debates about the ethical
principles of collecting works of art.94 Cicero’s arguments provided
the philosophical basis not only for the emerging customary rule
that prohibited plunder, but also required returning plundered
artifacts to their territories of origin.95 Moreover, the ideologies of
the Enlightenment promoted classical international law jurists to
frame the law of nations by the use of reason. 96 The looting of
cultural artifacts could thus no longer be regarded as a natural right
of conquest, because such practices were not considered a necessity
for sovereigns to engage in or sustain a war. These changes all
impacted the understandings of classical international law jurists
about the law of nature regarding the right of conquest and
especially the treatment of property.
The new usage that refrained from plundering each other’s
cultural artifacts, in conformity with the law of nature that restricted
the right of conquest by military necessity, clearly manifested in the
CIL rule that prohibited wartime looting of cultural property which
was established at the end of the eighteenth century. Admittedly,
this usage mostly appeared in Europe during this period. However,
as Grotius emphasized, the law of nature was generally applied to
all nations, because it represented “the common sense of
See MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 2-3.
Id. at 363-64.
92
Cicero Comments on the Impact on Foreign Envoys to Rome of Verres’ Plundered
Art from Asia Minor, in MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 363-64; Cicero
Comments on Scipio Aemilianus Repatriation of Art Booty from Carthage to Sicilian Cities,
in MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 366-67.
93
Nahlik, supra note 37, at 1071.
94
MILES, ART AS PLUNDER, supra note 3, at 8.
95
Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 31.
96 See generally SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 40-44 (describing the
Enlightenment Era’s impact on use of reason in international law).
90

91
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mankind.” 97 The CIL rule against wartime plunder of cultural
property based on the usage thus had a universal application
because of the universal law of nature, even though the practices in
conformity therewith were more common in Europe.
b. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Nineteenth
Century
Although the CIL rule against plunder was established at the
end of the eighteenth century, this rule might have been modified or
abandoned due to the dynamic nature of CIL. This section thus
explores two issues. It first inquires as to what was the legal test to
identify the continuous validity of CIL rules that were previously
established, especially when the law of nations shifted its
philosophy away from natural law and toward positivism. It then
applies this test to analyze whether the CIL rule against plunder was
still valid during the nineteenth century.
i.

The Approach to Identify the Validity of CIL Rules as
Previously Established

The history of the nineteenth century witnessed the fundamental
shift within the philosophy of international law from natural law
toward positivism. This shift was not a sudden change but occurred
gradually during that century. The question then arises as to how
to evaluate the validity of CIL rules during the transitional period
when natural law was being replaced with positivism. During this
transitional period, the law of nature and state consent closely
interacted with each other and mutually constituted the basis of CIL.
State consent played an increasing role in identifying CIL at that
time, which was primarily presumed to exist based on consistent
state practices. 98 However, the law of nature should not be
neglected. Many influential jurists in the nineteenth century still
GROTIUS, supra note 88, at 42.
See, e.g., N. Atl. Coast Fisheries (U.K. v. U.S.), 11 R.I.A.A. 167, 206 (Perm. Ct.
Arb. 1910) (Draco, J., dissenting); The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900);
Regina v. Keyn (The Franconia), 2 Exch. Div. 63, 202 (Lord Cockburn C.J. 1876) (“To
be binding, the law must have received the assent of the nations who are to be
bound by it.”); David Kennedy, International Law and the Nineteenth Century: History
of an Illusion, 65 NORDIC J. INT’L L. 385, 398 (1996).
97
98
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regarded the law of nature as the essential basis that determined the
binding force of CIL.99 Henry Maine in particular pointed out that
“[t]he most useful and practical part of the Law of Nations is, no
doubt, instituted or positive law, founded on usage, consent, and
agreement. But it would be improper to separate this law entirely
from natural jurisprudence.”100 Wheaton also defined international
law from the perspective of both natural law and positivism.101 The
law of nature especially served as an essential basis to develop state
consent in codifying the laws and customs of war during the second
half of the nineteenth century. Francis Lieber, who initiated this
effort by drafting the Lieber Code for the U.S. government in 1863,
observed that rules were created through “[u]sage, history, reason,
and conscientiousness, a sincere love of truth, justice and
civilization.”102 His work strongly encouraged states to codify the
law of war and indeed provided the material basis for the Brussels
Declaration of 1874, the Oxford Manuals of 1880, and the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907.103 As the preambles of the Hague
Conventions of 1899 and 1907 revealed, justice and reason were two
of the main foundations in drafting these agreements.104
Meanwhile, the opinions of states began to draw increasing
attention to identifying CIL rules.105 These opinions of states may
99
JAMES BRIERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS 69 (Oxford Univ. Press 7th ed. 2012)
(ebook) (quoting Lord Mansfield, “the law of nations is founded on justice, equity,
convenience, and the reason of the thing, and confirmed by long usage.”). Henry
Halleck and James Lorimer also contended that it was the law of nature that made
custom, usage and practice legally binding. H. W. HALLECK, ELEMENTS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW AND LAWS OF WAR 32 (Philadelphia, J. B. Lippincott & Co.
1878); 1 JAMES LORIMER, THE INSTITUTES OF THE LAW OF NATIONS 19, 27 (Edinburgh,
William Blackwood & Sons 1883).
100
Maine, supra note 67, at 32.
101
WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 22.
102
RICHARD S. HARTIGAN, LIEBER’S CODE AND THE LAW OF WAR 10 (1983).
103
Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 56-72.
104
1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21; 1907 Hague Conventions, supra
note 21.
105
See, e.g., LEWIS R. HARLEY, FRANCIS LIEBER, HIS LIFE AND POLITICAL
PHILOSOPHY 153 (New York, Columbia Univ. Press 1899) (providing testimony that
the Lieber Code was drafted on the grounds of “the legal consciousness of civilized
peoples.”); SCHLUTTER, supra note 65, at 16 (arguing from Austin’s perspective that
international law was a framework “which [is] imposed upon nations or sovereigns
by opinions current amongst nations.”); Th. Baty, The Institute of International Law
on Pacific Blockade, 21 L. MAG. & L. REV. 285 (1896) (arguing that the opinions of
nations laid the foundation for international law and made the rules valid to
nations); WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 90 (concluding that the usage
and opinion of nations generally recognized that the right of intervention or
interference was an incontrovertible right of sovereignty).
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serve as convincing proof that how states understood the law of
nature, or can be used as a basis to develop state consent. 106
Although the three theories are in tension with one another in legal
philosophy, the law of nature, state consent, and the opinions of
state “all played a significant role in developing customary
international law during this period, but with different degrees of
significance.”107 Accordingly, to test the validity of established CIL
rules in the nineteenth century one must depend on an overall
evaluation of the law of nature, state consent, and the opinions of
states in a dynamic context.
ii.

The CIL Rule Against Plunder Remained Valid

The nineteenth century provides two episodes for the
investigation of whether the CIL rule that prohibited wartime
plunder of cultural artifact remained valid during this period.
1. Napoleon’s Looting and the Development of the CIL Rule
Against Plunder
In the first case study, Napoleon conducted a systematic and
organized looting of cultural property in Europe for nearly two
decades.108 Because Napoleon’s looting deviated dramatically from
the CIL rule against such practices, this substantial deviation could
have cast doubt on the validity of this rule at that time.
However, the CIL rule that prohibited wartime plunder of
cultural property was, instead of being weakened, strengthened as
a result of Napoleon’s looting. Napoleon attempted to conceal his
organized confiscation of cultural artifacts during his campaign in
Belgium in 1794, which suggested that Napoleon knew that the right
of conquest during that time did not permit the systematic looting

Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 14.
Id.
108
For background on how Napoleon conducted an immense plunder of
cultural artifacts in Europe, see generally CECIL GOULD, TROPHY OF CONQUEST, THE
MUSÉE NAPOLÉON AND THE CREATION OF THE LOUVRE (1965); Patricia Mainardi,
Assuring the Empire of the Future: The 1798 Fête de la Liberté, 48 ART J. 155 (1989);
Dorothy M. Quynn, The Art Confiscations of the Napoleonic Wars, 50 AM. HIST. REV.
437 (1945).
106

107

Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository,

1122

U. Pa. J. Int'l L.

[Vol. 42:4

of cultural artifacts anymore.109 Napoleon, nevertheless, sought to
abandon this restriction by using force to revive the Roman practice
of looting.
However, Napoleon’s looting provoked strong
condemnations across Europe and even within France. 110 These
public reactions, for the first time, were so forceful as to raise serious
doubts about the legality of such looting, which convincingly
suggests that “modern civilization was no longer tolerant of such a
practice.”111
More significantly, the CIL rule that prohibited Napoleon’s
looting was strengthened by the critical responses of European
sovereigns to his looting as being contrary to “every principle of
justice and the usages of modern warfare.” 112 These responses
represented their respective states’ opinions, which clearly reflected
their views of the law of nature that underlay the justice and usages
of modern warfare. On this basis, European sovereigns consented
to return plundered artifacts to their territories of origin after
Napoleon’s final defeat. 113 These acts of restitution not only
confirmed the existence of the international obligation that
prohibited such plunder but also developed this CIL rule by
recognizing restitution as the primary remedy for its violation.114
2. Codification of the Established CIL Rule Against Plunder
States attempted to codify the laws and customs of war during
the second half of the nineteenth century. The rule against wartime
plunder of cultural property, inter alia, was included in these efforts.
It started with the Lieber Code, which required in Articles 34-36 and
38 that monuments of art, religious temples, churches, and libraries
should be spared unless the standard of military necessity was
met. 115 Article 35 especially called for the protection of classical
works of art and libraries, “even when they are contained in fortified
Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 41-42.
Id. at paras. 43-46.
111
Id.
112
Id. at paras. 47-50 (quoting Viscount Castlereagh from infra note 153).
113
See discussion infra Section IV.a.4.
114
See discussion infra Section IV.a.5.
115
Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the Field
General Order No. 100, art. 34-36, 38 (War Dep’t Apr. 14, 1863), reprinted in 3 THE
WAR OF THE REBELLION 148 (1902) [hereinafter the Lieber Code].
109

110
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places whilst besieged or bombarded.”116 Compared to the Lieber
Code, the Brussels Declaration had a stricter rule, which stated in
Articles 8 and 38 that military necessity was not considered an
exception for confiscation of property belonging to churches and
museums of fine art.117 Article 53 of the Oxford Manual offered the
strictest rule, stating, “All destruction or wilful damage to
institutions of this character, historic monuments, archives, Works
of art, or science, is formally forbidden, save when urgently
demanded by military necessity.” 118 The Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907 followed the stipulation of the Brussels Declaration in
their Conventions. 119 The two Conventions also stated that
competent authorities should prosecute perpetrators who
conducted illicit confiscation. 120 This provision was copied from
Article 8 of the Brussels Declaration, which required that all seizure
of institutions of religion or art, historic monuments and works of
art “should be made the subject of [legal proceedings] by the
competent authorities.”121 Later, the Nuremberg tribunal relied on
the provisions in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 to
prosecute war criminals who illegally confiscated works of art
during World War II.122
As many nineteenth-century jurists observed, international
agreements at that time may merely formalize the established CIL
rules.123 The Nuremberg tribunal also confirmed, “[I]n many cases
treaties do no more than express and define for more accurate
reference the principles of law already existing.”124 The Lieber Code
was not merely a U.S. martial law but rather a reflection of the
Id. at art. 35.
Project of an International Declaration Concerning the Laws and Customs
of War, adopted by the Conference of Brussels art. 8, 38, Aug. 27, 1874, reprinted in
1 AM. J. INT’L L. 96 (1907) [hereinafter the Brussels Declaration].
118
Institute De Droit International, Les Lois De La Guerre Sur Terre [The Laws
of War in Land] art. 53, (Sept. 9, 1880) [hereinafter the Oxford Manual of 1880].
119
See The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 46, 56; The 1907
Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 46, 56;
120 The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21, at art. 56, (“All seizure of . . .
such institutions, to historical monuments, works of art or science, is prohibited,
and should be made the subject of [legal] proceedings.”).
121 The Brussels Declaration, supra note 117, at art. 8.
122
See infra text accompanying note 136.
123 WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 24; WILSON & TUCKER, supra note
67, at 88-89; PHILLIMORE, supra note 78, at 86.
124
Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal (Oct. 1, 1946),
reprinted in 41 AM. J. INT’L L. 172, 219 (1947).
116

117
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established law of war; as Article 4 stipulated, “Martial Law is
simply military authority exercised in accordance with the laws and
usages of war.” 125 Fedor F. Marten, who drafted the Brussels
Declaration, described the conference as “in a sense the natural
development of a thought, which has long been recognized as
just.” 126 As the preamble stated, the Oxford Manual sought to
observe the law of war by “codifying the accepted ideas of our age
so far as this has appeared allowable and practicable.” 127 Most
provisions in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 also merely
restated international law rather than amending it,128 including the
rule against the plunder of cultural property. As the records reveal,
there was a clear consensus about the drafting of Article 56 without
any debates throughout all the meetings of both conferences.129 The
context of Article 56 was thus unanimously adopted in conformity
with the wording of the Brussels Declaration with only minor
changes in expression.130
As this history shows, while these international agreements
were formalized through state consent, this consent reflected a
common understanding of established CIL rules at the time. The
states’ opinions were based on their observance of the law of nature
as one of the foundations for these rules. In particular, the CIL rule
against plunder was not created at that time by state consent, but
rather, it was already established on a natural law basis. States
recognized the existence of this rule and then accepted it by
expressing their consent. The CIL rule against plunder thus

125 The Lieber Code, supra note 115, at art. 4 (establishing that the Code is a
reflection of existing law of war in its title “Code for the Government of Armies in
the Field as Authorized by the Laws and Usages of War on Land”) (emphasis added).
126
FEDOR F. MARTENS, LA PAIX ET LA GUERRE: LA CONFÉRENCE DE BRUXELLES 1874
[PEACE AND WAR: THE BRUSSELS CONFERENCE OF 1874] 76 (1901) (quoting as
translated by the author of this article).
127 The Oxford Manual of 1880, supra note 118, at preface.
128
See generally The 1899 Hague Conventions, supra note 21 (preamble); The
1907 Hague Conventions, supra note 21 (preamble); 1 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE
HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES (THE CONFERENCE OF 1899) 272 (James Brown Scott ed.,
1920); THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, at xi (James
Brown Scott ed., 2d ed. 1915); Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), supra note 26;
WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 25.
129
See THE CONFERENCE OF 1899, supra note 128, at 77, 261, 442; 1 THE
PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1907 631
(James Brown Scott ed., 1920); 3 THE PROCEEDINGS OF THE HAGUE PEACE
CONFERENCES: THE CONFERENCE OF 1907 239, 1054 (James Brown Scott ed., 1920).
130
MARTENS, supra note 126, at 546, 563-64.
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remained continuously valid even though the philosophy of
international law changed.131
c. The Development of the CIL Rule Against Plunder in the Twentieth
Century
Positivism was well established as the primary foundation of the
philosophy of international law throughout the twentieth century.132
Under this philosophy, the conventional approach to identifying
CIL rules requires general state practice and opinio juris. In this
approach, it is broadly agreed that once a CIL rule has been
established, unilateral withdrawal from the rule by any state is
usually not allowed. 133 Subsequent practices which prove to be
inconsistent with the established CIL rules are thus generally
considered a breach of the rules, until these rules are ultimately
modified or abandoned by subsequent inconsistent practices over a
period of time.134
During the twentieth century, the two World Wars provided
significant occasions for examining the validity of this CIL rule
through the lens of practices that substantially diverged from the
Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 69-73.
Kennedy, supra note 98, at 398.
133
International Law Association, Statement of Principles Applicable to the
Formation of General Customary International Law, 69 ILA Report of Conference 27
(2000):
There is fairly widespread agreement that, even if there is a persistent
objector rule in international law, it applies only when the customary rule
is in the process of emerging. It does not, therefore, benefit States which
came into existence only after the rule matured, or which became involved
in the activity in question only at a later stage. Still less can it be invoked
by those who existed at the time and were already engaged in the activity
which is the subject of the rule, but failed to object at that stage. In other
words, there is no “subsequent objector” rule.
134
See Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar.
v. U.S.), supra note 31, at para. 186 (“In order to deduce the existence of customary
rules, the Court deems it sufficient that . . . instances of state conduct inconsistent
with a given rule should generally have been treated as breaches of that rule, not as
indications of the recognition of a new rule.”); K. Wolfke, Some Persistent
Controversies Regarding Customary International Law, 24 Neth. Y.B. INT’L L. 1, 7-8
(1993); MAURICE H. MENDELSON, THE FORMATION OF CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL
LAW 174-75 (1998) (stating “established customary rules are rarely simply
abolished: they are normally replaced by other rules.”); MARK E. VILLIGER,
CUSTOMARY INTERNATIONAL LAW AND TREATIES 48 (1985) (“As long as the previous
opinio has not been eroded, and the new opinio is not established, the diverging
practice remains a form either of persistent or subsequent objection.”).
131

132
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law. Instead of being eroded, this CIL rule was strengthened by
states’ efforts to safeguard cultural artifacts from being removed
during warfare.135 Acts of restitution after the two World Wars also
developed this CIL rule by confirming that restitution was the
primary remedy for violations of the law. Moreover, the looting of
cultural property has been recognized as a war crime since the
Nuremberg trials. During the trial of Alfred Rosenberg, who was
notoriously known as the head of Nazi Special Task Force
“Einsatzstab Reichsleiter Rosenberg” dedicated to the plunder of
cultural artifacts, the International Military Tribunal found
Rosenberg guilty of “looting cultural property in occupied
territories” on the basis of Article 56 of the Hague Conventions of
1899 and 1907, and viewed this article, inter alia, as deriving from
CIL that was recognized by all civilized nations. 136 During this
period, states further developed this rule through consistent efforts
to conclude a special convention devoted to the protection of
cultural property in war, which finally brought the 1954 Hague
Convention and its first protocol to convene.137
IV.

RESTITUTION: REMEDY FOR THE BREACH OF THE CIL RULE
AGAINST PLUNDER

This part investigates how restitution has been established as the
primary remedy for violations of the CIL rule that prohibits wartime
plunder of cultural property. Because violations of CIL rules
provide occasions for examining the proper remedy under CIL, this
investigation pays close attention to the instances of looting that
occurred during Napoleon’s reign and the two World Wars. Given
that the history regarding wars and peace negotiations was an
essential source of the law of nations at that time, 138 this part
especially investigates the history of how states negotiated,
consented to, and enforced restitution in these circumstances.

Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 75-77.
Judgment of the Nuremberg International Military Tribunal, supra note
124, at 235, 237-38, 282.
137
Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 81-85.
138
See WHEATON & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 22-31 (listing the history of
wars and peace negotiations as one of the six sources of international law).
135

136
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a. Restitution After Napoleon’s Defeat
There is some skepticism as to whether the outcome in favor of
restitution after Napoleon’s final defeat simply reflects the
traditional right of conquest. This section shows that these acts of
restitution were not arbitrary conclusions made by victorious
powers, but an expression of the existing CIL, which regarded
restitution as the only appropriate remedy for the breach of the
established CIL rule against wartime looting of cultural artifacts.
i.

Dilemma on Restitution

After Napoleon was first defeated in April 1814, the allied
powers expressed divergent attitudes toward how they should deal
with Napoleon’s plundered artifacts. 139 A group of victim states
supported restitution, while Britain was reluctant to push this claim
forward, and Russia was opposed to it because Britain and Russia
worried that restitution might harm the political stability of the
newly restored French monarchy.140 The French government took
advantage of the allied powers’ disagreement and strongly opposed
the restitution claims.141 As a result, the first Treaty of Paris, signed
on May 30, 1814, was silent on the return of plundered artifacts.142
However, Napoleon’s return and his final defeat at Waterloo
gave rise to a complete change in these circumstances and broke the
impasse regarding restitution among the allied powers. The allied
powers then began to negotiate matters regarding restitution. 143
Meanwhile, the French government continued to protest against
such matters partly on the grounds that many plundered artifacts
already belonged to France as a result of existing treaties. 144
However, given their coercive nature, these treaties could not grant
the ownership of looted artifacts to France, as it was an established
principle of international law that coerced treaties were unable to
TREUE, supra note 3, at 187–88.
SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 57-58; Quynn, supra note 108, at 459-60.
141
TREUE, supra note 3, at 187.
142
Letter from The Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh (Sept. 23,
1815), in 3 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1815-1816, at 207, 209 (London, James
Ridgway & Sons, Picadilly 1838) (1815).
143
Id. at 207.
144
SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 53-55.
139
140
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transfer the valid titles of property.145 France also claimed that the
right of conquest during the time of Napoleon’s rule permitted
France to retain the artifacts that were not formally transferred by
treaties.146 This debate raises an essential question as to what the
legal basis was for the allied powers to regain their lost artifacts. In
other words, did the restitution actions after the final defeat of
Napoleon reflect another vicious cycle of exercising victorious
power?
ii.

The Legal Grounds for Claiming Restitution

During Napoleon’s rule, Napoleon’s extensive looting provoked
strong condemnation from outside and even within France. 147
Among all critics, Quatremère de Quincy, a prominent French
archaeologist at the time, argued that these artifacts should not be
removed because their artistic and historical value could only be
fully appreciated in their original surroundings.148 Quatremère also
argued that traditional Roman right of conquest had been
abandoned by the eighteenth-century law of war and should not be
revived149 Quatremère later petitioned the French government to
stop confiscating these artifacts, which intensified the public debate
on the legality of Napoleon’s confiscation. Forty-seven of the most
distinguished French artists at the time signed the petition against
Napoleon’s looting, while another group of thirty-seven lessdistinguished artists soon after sent a counter-petition defending the
French government’s looting on the grounds of the traditional right
of conquest.150 Although Quatremère’s arguments and the public
debate did not stop Napoleon’s looting, Quatremère’s idea and its
circulation in European civil society prepared the philosophical
basis for the restitution of plundered cultural artifacts to their
territories of origin after Napoleon was defeated.
After Napoleon was finally defeated and during the peace
negotiations in Paris, the allied powers sought to “discover a mode

145
146
147
148
149
150

Marchisotto, supra note 38, at 694; SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 61-62.
SANDHOLTZ, supra note 25, at 53-55.
Zhang, supra note 39, at paras. 43-46.
TREUE, supra note 3, at 178.
Mainardi, supra note 108, at 156.
Id.
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of doing justice” regarding Napoleon’s looting.151 In this process,
two British diplomats played a central role in developing a
consensus about restitution.
One figure was the Duke of
Wellington, the commander who defeated Napoleon at Waterloo
and the lead British diplomat in Paris. He supported the restitution
of stolen artistic treasures to their countries of origin on the grounds
that Napoleon’s looting violated the law of war.152 The other figure
was Lord Castlereagh, the British diplomat to the Congress of
Vienna, an assembly in 1814-1815 to reorganize Europe after
Napoleon was defeated. Agreeing with Wellington, Castlereagh
argued for restitution because Napoleon’s looting was “contrary to
every principle of justice and the usages of modern warfare.”153
Wellington and Castlereagh’s understandings of the modern
law of warfare confirmed that the CIL rule against plunder was
established in the laws and customs of war at that time. Moreover,
their arguments reflected that the right to restitution was the
primary remedy as a natural outcome flowing from the violation of
this prohibitive rule. As Castlereagh asserted, restitution of
plundered cultural artifacts to their territories of origin was the
“only guide to justice.”154
iii.

Reaction of the Allied Powers to Restitution

Wellington circulated his opinion at the Paris diplomatic
conference and received general support among other allied
powers.155 The Prussian minister, Prince Hardenberg, soon stated
his total agreement with the British diplomats’ reasoning. 156
Austria, Spain, the Low Countries, the German states, the Italian
states, and the Vatican all claimed that France had no right to retain
151 Letter from The Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh, supra note
142, at 207.
152
SELECT COMMITTEE ON CULTURE, MEDIA AND SPORT, MEMORANDUM
SUBMITTED BY THE COMMITTEE ON THE PARTHENON, 2000, HC 371-III, ¶¶ 7.3-.4 (UK);
CHRISTOPHER HIBBERT, WELLINGTON: A PERSONAL HISTORY 199 (1997).
153
Letter from Viscount Castlereagh to the Plenipotentiaries of Austria,
Prussia, and Russia (Sept. 1815), in 3 BRITISH AND FOREIGN STATE PAPERS 1815-1816,
supra note 142, at 203-04.
154
Id. at 207.
155
See Quynn, supra note 108, at 448 and 452-53 (quoting to publications in the
London Courier on Oct. 3-4, 1815).
156
Wayne Sandholtz, Plunder, Restitution, and International Law, 17 INT’L J.
CULTURAL PROP. 147, 151 (2010).
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these plundered artifacts.157 They then rejected the request of the
French government, which sought to include a clause in the second
Treaty of Paris in 1815 to retain all the previously plundered cultural
artifacts. 158 Wellington, on behalf of the allied powers, rejected
another French request, which proposed to make restitution to only
a few victim states, such as Prussia.159 As Wellington explained, he
acted for all the allied powers and therefore was obliged to claim
restitution for all of them.160 Castlereagh also claimed that the allied
powers bore the duty of facilitating the restitution of plundered
cultural artifacts to their territories of origin.161
The opinion held among the allied powers about their rights to
restitution was also expressed by their tacit consent to the Dutch
proposal to enforce restitution by the Netherlands’ own actions.
During the peace negotiations in Paris, the Dutch representative
intended to take action regarding restitution, since no satisfactory
answers had come from France.162 Through Wellington, the Dutch
representative inquired of the ministers of the allied powers
whether they would oppose such action.163 As Wellington revealed,
the allied powers had no objection to the Dutch proposed action.164
The absence of objection signaled that the allied powers as a whole
formed tacit consent to exercising the right to restitution of
plundered cultural artifacts.
iv.

Reaction of France to Restitution

The belief that France had no right to retain plundered cultural
artifacts existed not only among the allied powers but was also
expressed within France itself. Prince Talleyrand-Périgord, the
French representative who argued for France to retain plundered
artifacts during the peace negotiations, admitted in his memoirs,
“[P]erhaps the monuments of art should never have entered the
Id.
Letter from the Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh, supra note 142,
at 209-10.
159
Id.
160
Id.
161
Sandholtz, supra note 156.
162 Letter from The Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh, supra note
142, at 208.
163
Id.
164
Id. at 208.
157

158
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domain of conquest.”165 Even Napoleon himself knew that modern
warfare no longer permitted the traditional practice of looting
cultural artifacts.166
The actual belief of the French government regarding the
illegality of Napoleon’s looting explains why they opposed
restitution during negotiations, but tacitly consented to restitution
in practice. For instance, Wellington sought the opinion of Louis
XVIII, the newly restored French king, concerning which means of
restitution would be least offensive to him.167 Louis XVIII replied
that he could give no order upon this matter and Wellington might
act as he thought proper.168 In another instance, Talleyrand advised
the director of French museums to let the Prussians start packing
their statues and busts during Prussia’s negotiations with the
museums. 169 Later, when Prussia attempted to remove their
dispossessed artifacts from the Louvre but met the resistance of
eighty French national guardsmen, the minister of the French
National Guard instructed his men to allow the Prussian army to
load their properties.170
These episodes once again confirmed the general belief that
France had no right to retain these artifacts removed as spoils of war.
France thus fulfilled its obligation of restitution and almost all the
victim states eventually regained their lost cultural artifacts.171 More
significantly, the right to restitution was not only reflected in acts of
restitution, but also confirmed in the second Treaty of Paris, signed
on November 20, 1815, which obliged France to return the
plundered artifacts to their former sovereigns.172 It is worth noting
that this peace treaty came after the allied powers’ acts of restitution
were completed. If acts of restitution were made only after this
peace treaty was concluded, there might be doubt as to whether
restitution was enforced merely on the grounds of treaty clauses and
165
2 CHARLES MAURICE DE TALLEYRAND-PÉRIGORD, MÉMOIRES, 1807-1815, at 343
(Plon 1957), as quoted in Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 152.
166
Zhang, supra note 39, paras. 41-42.
167 Letter from The Duke of Wellington to Viscount Castlereagh, supra note
142, at 207.
168
Id. at 208.
169
TREUE, supra note 3, at 191.
170
Id. at 191-92.
171
Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 150; TREUE, supra note 3, at 195.
172
TIM CHAPMAN, THE CONGRESS OF VIENNA: ORIGINS, PROCESSES, AND RESULTS
55 (1998); CHARLES G. ROBERTSON, ENGLAND UNDER THE HANOVERIANS 472 (1930);
HENRY M. STEPHENS, REVOLUTIONARY EUROPE, 1789-1815, at 354 (1907).
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not identified as a general international law obligation to reparation.
However, in this episode, restitution clauses concluded in the
second Treaty of Paris convincingly suggests that acts of restitution
were made on the CIL basis, which was then confirmed by peace
treaty clauses.
v.

The CIL Right to Restitution

As analyzed before, determining whether previously
established CIL rules maintained their validity in the nineteenth
century requires an overall investigation of the law of nature, state
consent, and the opinions of state. Wellington and Castlereagh’s
arguments were made according to a general understanding of the
justice and practice of modern warfare, which reflected the law of
nature that restricted the traditional right of conquest and
prohibited wartime plunder of cultural artifacts. It was not a onesided belief representing the interests of only victorious powers or
of victim states, but rather an opinion shared by the French
government and neutral states that were not victims of Napoleon’s
looting, such as Great Britain. Based on this general belief, European
nations, including France, agreed to make restitution. In this sense,
the outcome of restitution not only reflected the first-tier
international obligation for states not to plunder cultural artifacts at
that time, but also contributed to confirming restitution as the
primary remedy. The outcome in favor of restitution thus was not
another reflection of victors’ right similar to the traditional right of
conquest but was deeply established in the CIL of warfare.
Although it was impracticable to gain restitution without having
victory in war, such victory only provided the necessary means to
enforce restitution rather than constituting the legitimate basis of
these acts.
The CIL obligation regarding restitution was also reflected in the
Marquis de Somerueles case of 1812.173 In this case, Britain seized a
ship carrying cultural artifacts owned by the U.S. Pennsylvania
Academy of the Fine Arts as war prizes during its war with the

173 THE MARQUIS DE SOMERUELES: VICE-ADMIRALTY COURT OF HALIFAX, NOVA
SCOTIA STEWART’S VICE ADMIRALTY REPORTS 482 (1813), reprinted in JOHN H.
MERRYMAN, NOTE ON THE MARQUIS DE SOMERUELES, 2 INT’L J. CULTURAL PROP. 319
(1996).
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United States in 1812. 174 Judge Croke issued restitution on the
grounds that “[t]he arts and sciences are admitted amongst all
civilized nations, as forming an exception to the severe rights of
warfare, and as entitled to favour and protection.”175 This case was
determined by the British Vice-Admiralty Court of Halifax, and
decisions of admiralty courts were considered to be one of the main
proofs for the law of nations in the nineteenth century.176 This case
thus serves as a significant precedent showing the established CIL
rule against artifact plunder and CIL obligation to restitution at that
time.
b. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During and After
World War I
Restitution of plundered cultural artifacts to their countries of
origin after World War I were settled through peace treaties. This
process began with the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 in Articles 245247, which obliged Germany to return plundered cultural artifacts
to France, Belgium and other states.177 In addition to the Treaty of
Versailles, other peace treaties also contained clauses concerning the
restitution of looted cultural artifacts.178 As such, restitution clauses
were not an occasional provision that only applied to Germany, but
they remained a feature of many peace treaties arising from World
War I.
More significantly, treaty provisions provided that artifacts for
restitution were not limited to plunders during World War I, but
also included plunders during the previous wars of the eighteenth
century. Article 245 of the Treaty of Versailles required restitution
Id. at 319, 321.
Id. at 322.
176
TRAVERS TWISS, THE LAW OF NATIONS CONSIDERED AS INDEPENDENT LEGAL
COMMUNITIES 132 (Oxford, The Clarendon Press 1875); WILSON & TUCKER, supra note
67, at 37.
177
Treaty of Peace Between the Principal Allied and Associated Powers and
Germany art. 245-47, June 28, 1919, 225 C.T.S. 188 [hereinafter the Treaty of
Versailles].
178
See, e.g., Treaty with Hungary, Hung.-U.S., art. 177, Aug. 29, 1921, 8 U.S.T.
982 [hereinafter the Treaty of Trianon]; Treaty with Austria, Austria-U.S., art. 195,
annex I-IV, Sept. 10, 1919, 5 U.S.T. 215 [hereinafter the Treaty of Saint Germain];
Treaty of Peace Between the Principal Allied and Turkey art. 422, Aug. 10, 1920, S.
TREATY DOC. NO. 7 (1921) [hereinafter the Treaty of Sevres]; Sandholtz, supra note
156, at 158 (citing to the 1921 Treaty of Riga).
174

175
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of cultural objects seized by the German authorities from France
during the 1870–1871 war. 179 The Treaty of Trianon of 1921 in
Article 177 obliged Hungary to return “all the records, documents
and historical material possessed by public institutions . . . . which
have been removed since January 1, 1868.”180 The Treaty of Riga of
1921 in Article 11 obligated the Soviet Union and Ukraine to return
to Poland a variety of cultural and historical objects, which had been
seized under imperial Russian occupation since 1772 and the reign
of Catherine the Great. 181 The Treaty of Saint Germain of 1920
required the Austrian authorities to return a list of looted cultural
objects to what was then the State of Czechoslovakia, including
objects that were removed as early as 1718.182 The Treaty of Sèvres
of 1921 demanded that Turkey restored all objects of religious,
archaeological, historical, or artistic interest confiscated before
August 1914 to the government of the territory from which they
were taken.183 Although this treaty never entered into force, the lack
of treaty obligation does not diminish the treaty’s value in reflecting
the established CIL obligation to restitution arising from violations
of the CIL rule against plunder. These restitution clauses not only
reaffirmed the existence of the laws and customs of war that
prohibited the looting of cultural property from the eighteenth
through nineteenth centuries, but also confirmed that restitution
served as the primary remedy for violation of the international
obligation against artifact plunder.
c. The Development of the CIL Right to Restitution During and After
World War II
i.

Broad Definition of War Plunders

The widespread looting of cultural property that occurred
during World War II pushed the international community to
strengthen the CIL rule against plunder to prevent future violations.
The Allies’ efforts to restore plundered artifacts started with the
179
180
181
182
183

The Treaty of Versailles, supra note 177, at art. 245.
The Treaty of Trianon, supra note 178, at art. 177.
Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 158.
The Treaty of Saint Germain, supra note 178, at art. 195.
The Treaty of Sèvres, supra note 178, art 422.
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London Declaration announced in 1943, which attempted to give a
formal warning to all concerned regarding the treatment of looted
property during the war. 184 The London Declaration was the
founding agreement for the restitution during and after WWII and
defined wartime plunder in a broad sense, which included every
form of transfer of property, even transactions that were apparently
legal in form. 185 Practices of searching for looted artifacts and
returning them to their territories of origin all followed this
agreement.186 The United States, Great Britain, and France, along
with the Federal Republic of Germany, signed the Bonn Convention
in 1952. 187 This convention further clarified the scope of what
constitutes plunder to include taking under duress, larceny,
requisitioning, and other forms of dispossession. 188
More
extensively, cultural artifacts acquired as gifts would also be subject
to restoration if those artifacts were obtained by use of duress or an
individual’s official position. 189 Cultural artifacts acquired by
purchase were likewise required for restitution, unless they had
been brought into a given country for sale. 190 Such a broad
conceptualization of plunder was later adopted by the 1954 Hague
Convention in Article 4, which requires contracting parties to
“prohibit, prevent and, if necessary, put a stop to any form of theft,
pillage or misappropriation of, and any acts of vandalism directed
against cultural property.”191

184
Inter-Allied Declaration Against Acts of Dispossession Committed in
Territories Under Enemy Occupation or Control, Jan. 9, 1943, reprinted in 1 FOREIGN
RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES: DIPLOMATIC PAPERS, 1943, at 443-44 (1943)
[hereinafter the London Declaration].
185
Id.
186
See, e.g., infra note 208; see also Final Act ch. VI, art. 1, in DEP’T OF STATE, PUB.
NO. 2187, CONF. SERIES 55, UNITED NATIONS MONETARY AND FINANCIAL CONFERENCE
FINAL
ACT
AND
RELATED
DOCUMENTS
23
(1944),
http://fraser.stlouisfed.org/files/docs/historical/eccles/036_17_0004.pdf
[https://perma.cc/YX3W-4NDL] [hereinafter the Final Act of the United Nations
Monetary and Financial Conference]; John B. Howard, The Paris Agreement on
Reparation from Germany, in THE DISTRIBUTION OF REPARATION FROM GERMANY 19
(1946) (noting the Resolution on (a) and (g) of restitution policies).
187
Convention on the Settlement of the Matters Arising out of the War and
the Occupation, May 26, 1952, 6 U.S.T. 4411, 332 U.N.T.S. 219 [hereinafter the Bonn
Convention].
188
Id. at ch. V, art. 1(1).
189
Id. at art. 1(2)(a).
190
Id. at art. 1(2)(b).
191
The 1954 Hague Convention, supra note 21, at art. 4(3).
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Widespread Participation in Restitution

Placing the burden on military forces to protect cultural property
during battles, particularly by establishing special institutions to
send art professionals to the battlefield, became one feature of the
law of war practiced during World War II.192 For example, the U.S.
government set up the Roberts Commission and the Monuments,
Fine Arts and Archives program (MFAA) in 1943 to carry out this
mission.193 MFAA officers worked in the field to search out places
where the German armies conceivably stored their looted artistic
treasures and gathered information about the confiscation of artistic
treasures by the Axis Powers.194 Similar special institutes were also
established by the British government in the spring of 1944.195 These
efforts not only strengthened the international obligation against
plunder but also prepared for the restitution of looted artifacts after
the war.
State practices of returning plundered artifacts after the war
were widespread across the world. In Germany, restitution was first
enacted through regulations and programs by the Allied Control
Authority and military governments in different military zones until
1952.196 For example, Law 52 was adopted in September 1944, which
banned transactions concerning all objects of cultural or historical
value, irrespective of ownership. 197 This regulation also required
those who had custody of cultural property to carry out specific
responsibilities, such as preserving and keeping records regarding
those objects.198 Directive 1067, which was passed in July 1945 to
further implement Law 52, instructed the military government in
the U.S. zone of Germany (MGUS) to seize or block the transfer of
“works of art or cultural material of value or importance, regardless
of the ownership thereof.” 199 The MGUS then set up a unilateral
stopgap program in September 1945 for the return of stolen works
Zhang, supra note 39, at para. 77.
Wayne Sandholtz, Dynamics of International Norm Change: Rules Against
Wartime Plunder, 14 EUR. J. INT’L RELS. 101, 116-17 (2008).
194
Id.
195
Id.
196
KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 45-61.
197
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, NO. 9, MONTHLY REPORT OF MILITARY
GOVERNOR U.S. ZONE 13 (1946).
198
Id.
199
KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 44.
192

193
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of art, among other plundered properties.200 Meanwhile, uniform
procedures were approved in 1945 for the restitution of cultural
objects discovered in Germany that had been removed from
formerly German-occupied countries.201 These programs, as well as
the agreement on a definition of restitution, accelerated the process
of restitution.202 Since 1952, the duty to continuously search for and
return artifacts plundered during Germany’s occupation of any
territory was shifted from the Allied Control Authority and military
governments to the Federal Republic of Germany through the Bonn
Convention.203
In Austria, the Allied powers adopted similar restitution laws
and regulations as they did in Germany. 204 After the Treaty on
Reconstructing an Independent and Democratic Austria was
concluded in 1955, the duty shifted to the Austrian government to
restore all dispossessed artifacts that were presently in Austria.205
The restitution of looted artifacts discovered in Bulgaria,
Hungary, Italy, and Romania was made through armistice and
peace-treaty provisions. This process started with the Act of
Surrender of Italy of 1943, which ordered the seizure of all property
in Italy belonging to the Allied Nations, occupied countries, or their
nationals. 206 After that, armistice agreements with Hungary,
Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania all included provisions to return
artistic treasures that had been plundered by Axis powers and
agencies during the Axis powers’ occupation of these territories.207
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, NO. 9, supra note 197, at 15.
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, NO. 6, MONTHLY REPORT OF MILITARY
GOVERNOR U.S. ZONE 10 (1946).
202
MILITARY GOVERNMENT OF GERMANY, NO. 9, supra note 197, at 15.
203
The Bonn Convention, supra note 187, at art. 1(1).
204
KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 46.
205
State Treaty for the Re-establishment of an Independent and Democratic
Austria, May 15, 1955, 217 U.N.T.S. 225, art. 25(8)(d).
206
See KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 61 (noting documents associated with the
Act of Surrender of Italy 1943).
207
Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the
Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom on the One Hand and the Government of
Romania on the Other Concerning an Armistice art. 12, Sep. 12, 1944, 59 Stat. 1712;
Agreement Between the Governments of the United States of America, the Union
of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United Kingdom, on the One Hand, and the
Government of Bulgaria, on the Other Hand, Concerning an Armistice art. 11, Oct.
28, 1944, 58 Stat. 1498; Agreement Concerning an Armistice Between the Union of
Soviet Socialist Republics, the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern
Ireland, and the United States of America on One Hand and Hungary on the Other
art. 1, Jan. 20, 1945, 59 Stat. 1321.
200
201
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These armistice provisions were later confirmed by peace treaties
with Italy, Hungary, Bulgaria, Finland, and Romania. 208 These
peace treaty clauses clearly referred to the mutual understanding of
plunder and restitution adopted by the London Declaration.209
In Japan, the Allied powers appointed the Far Eastern
Commission to be in charge of the restitution of looted artifacts to
the government of the countries from which these artifacts were
removed.210 According to the U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for
Japan issued in 1945, “Full and prompt restitution will be required
of all identifiable looted property.”211 The Far Eastern Commission
summary report on January 4, 1946 further clarified looted property
to include “objects of historical, cultural, and artistic value.”212 In
particular, according to the Recovery of American Property
Confiscated by Japanese in China report that was released to the
press on October 16, 1947, “Looted property which was removed
from China and is discovered in Japan is to be delivered by the
Allied Military Authorities in Japan to the Chinese Government.”213
As for neutral states, any transfer of looted artifacts to or within
these countries would be invalid according to the London
Declaration.214 The final act of the United Nations Monetary and
Financial Conference of 1944 followed this principle and required
neutral states to take immediate measures to prevent any
disposition or transfer of plundered property or concealment of
property by fraudulent means within their territories.215 The United
208
Treaty of Peace with Italy art. 37, 75, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1245, 49 U.N.T.S.
3; Treaty of Peace with Hungary, art. 11, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 2065, 41 U.N.T.S. 135;
Treaty of Peace with Bulgaria, art. 22, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1915, 41 U.N.T.S. 21;
Treaty of Peace with Finland art. 24, Feb. 10, 1947, GR. BRIT. T.S. NO. 53 (1948); Treaty
of Peace with Romania art. 23, Feb. 10, 1947, 61 Stat. 1757, 42 U.N.T.S. 3.
209
See supra note 184.
210 Recovery of Identifiable Property Removed from Allied Countries (June 5,
1947), reprinted in 16 DEP’T STATE BULL. 1143, 1161 (1947).
211
U.S. Initial Post-Surrender Policy for Japan (Sept. 22, 1945), reprinted in 13
DEP’T STATE BULL. 421, 426 (1945).
212
General of the Army Macarthur, Far Eastern Commission Summary Report
on Trip to Japan (Jan. 4, 1946), pt. IV, art. 4, reprinted in 14 DEP’T STATE BULL. 353,
371 (1946).
213
Recovery of American Property Confiscated by Japanese in China (Oct. 16,
1947), reprinted in 17 DEP’T STATE BULL. 785, 835 (1947).
214 The London Declaration, supra note 184.
215 The Final Act of the United Nations Monetary and Financial Conference,
supra note 186, at art. 6; see also the Report of Commission III (Other Measures for
International Monetary and Financial Cooperation) to the Executive Plenary
Session (Jul. 21, 1944), id. at 114.
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States, France, and Britain concluded the agreement on the control
of looted works of art on July 8, 1946, in order to make joint efforts
to escalate the search for and restoration of plundered cultural
treasures located within neutral states. 216 Switzerland signed the
Currie Protocol on April 8, 1945, which obliged the Swiss to pass a
law to enforce the restitution of plundered artifacts.217 Switzerland
thus adopted the law on December 10, 1945, and established a
special procedure to sort out claims for restitution of looted
properties.218 Sweden likewise enacted the Looted Objects Law in
1945, which placed a stricter responsibility on the government to
enforce restitution and obliged the State Treasury to pay the amount
due to Swedish citizens who qualified as good-faith purchasers.219
These efforts to facilitate restitution were not limited to states in
Europe and Asia that had engaged in military actions during World
War II. The Resolution of the Mexican Delegation Dealing with the
Problems of Looted and Enemy Property delivered on March 2,
1945, represented joint efforts of American states in promoting the
restitution of artifacts plundered by Germany and Japan to their
countries of origin.220
V. A GENERAL OR EUROPEAN CIL RIGHT TO RESTITUTION?
This Part examines the scope of the application of the CIL Right
to Restitution in two sections. First, it inquires whether the CIL right
to restitution was a general CIL rule or a mere European custom,
because state practices in law-making were more often shown in
Europe before the twentieth century. Second, it investigates
whether the so-called standard of civilized nations, which was
articulated to exclude non-Western nations from participating in
international society in the nineteenth century, would prevent the
CIL right to restitution from applying to non-Western nations.
These discussions will impact whether claims for restitution can be
established today for states that suffered the looting of cultural
216
Statement of Policy with Respect to the Control of Looted Articles, Paris,
July 8, 1946, reprinted in 25 DEP’T STATE BULL. 321, 340 (1951).
217
KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 63.
218
Id.
219
Id.
220
Oscar Cox, Resolution of Mexican Delegation Dealing with the Problems
of Looted and Enemy Property (Mar. 2, 1945), reprinted in 12 DEP’T STATE BULL. 319,
350-51 (1945).
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property during nineteenth-century warfare to recover these
artifacts.
a. The Evolution and Application of the Law of War
There likely exists some doubt as to whether the CIL right to
restitution was a general CIL rule or merely a European custom
because European states engaged in law-making practices more
frequently before the twentieth century. Admittedly, the acts of
refraining from confiscating cultural objects as spoils of war and
restitution afterwards were distinctively European practices.
However, the essential issue is whether the customary law of
nations underlying these practices had or should be deemed to have
had a universal application at that time. Since applying the current
law-making rules would violate the non-retroactivity principle, it is
thus necessary to use the contemporaneous law-making criteria for
this inquiry.
As this article investigates, mandatory customary law of nations
existed during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, which
required both usages and adherence to the law of nature. Usages
could be merely European practices, but the law of nature was
considered to apply to all nations, including non-European nations
at that time.221 The universal law of nature was especially applied
in the law of war. As Judge Lord Stowell observed, within the law
of nations, although the rules of trade did not apply to the regions
outside of Europe, the basic rules of war had a universal application
to all nations.222 The CIL rules prohibiting plunder and providing
restitution as the remedy for violations of the rule, which were
established in the law of war at the end of the eighteenth century
under natural law, were thus considered general CIL rules that
applied to all nations.
During the nineteenth century, the theoretical basis of
international law was a mix of the law of nature and state consent,
which gives a new examination of the evolution of the CIL rule
against plunder as well as the right to restitution. In the
221
See GROTIUS, supra note 88, at 42; cf. DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at §162
(arguing that the law of nature also governed treaties between Christian nations
and non-Christian nations, because it reflected the nature of humanity beyond the
boundaries of religions).
222
TWISS, supra note 176, at 162.
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circumstances of Napoleon’s looting, this rule was not eroded but
indeed strengthened, as demonstrated by the means of his looting,
the public sentiment, and the reactions from other states to his acts.
Although state consent to restitution after Napoleon’s defeat was
made only by European sovereigns, such consent was a clear
reflection of the universal law of nature that prohibited wartime
plunder of cultural artifacts. 223 Castlereagh also argued that
Napoleon’s looting was “contrary to every principle of justice, and
to the usages of modern warfare.”224 “Modern” in this sentence was
a plain interpretation of time rather than a limitation on regions.
Codification of the laws and customs of war by a series of
international agreements in the second half of the nineteenth
century provides another example showing that the CIL rule against
plunder was applied to all nations. As the history of war repeatedly
demonstrated, military parties participating in warfare often failed
to faithfully obey the law of war in the form of CIL.225 Inspired by
Lieber’s model, European states began to recognize the necessity of
having state consent regarding common understandings of military
rules, so that these rules would be better executed in military
practices.226 This shared opinion led to the convening of the Brussels
Conference, the publication of the Oxford Manual, and finally the
adoption of the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907, which all
included the codification of the CIL rule against plunder. As this
history reveals, state consent was not adopted to create new rules of
warfare, but rather, as a means to strengthen the binding basis of
existing rules that were previously established on a natural law basis
with universal application. The CIL rule against plunder thus
remained universally valid even though the philosophy of
international law shifted away from natural law toward positivism.

223
224
225
226

See discussion supra Section IV.A.5.
Supra note 153, at 204.
MARTENS, supra note 126, at 79-80.
Id. at 73-75, 91, 95-96, 98-99.
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b. The So-Called Standard of Civilized Nations and Disputes over
Spoils of War
All states are considered civilized today. 227 During the
nineteenth century, however, colonial powers framed the standard
of civilized nations to exclude non-Western nations from
participating in international society.228 The connection between the
standard of civilized nations and disputes over spoils of war thus
raises a complexity in the application of international law, i.e.,
whether the CIL rule against plunder and the right to restitution
could be applied to non-Western nations at that time. 229 In this
section, I first explore the evolution of the standard of civilized
nations in history and then inquire as to the actual application of the
law of war in military practices, taking the two Opium Wars (18401860) as an example. I argue that the standard of civilized nations
was adopted in international law as a criterion for Western nations
to enjoy international law-making powers, rather than to exclude
227
The standard of civilization no longer exerts legal significance in making
or applying the rules of international law. HERSCH LAUTERPACHT, RECOGNITION IN
INTERNATIONAL LAW 31 n.1 (1947) (“Modern international law knows of no
distinction, for the purposes of recognition, between civilized and uncivilized States
or between States within and outside the international community of civilized
States”); 2 SIENHO YEE, We Are All “Civilized Nations”: Arguments for Cleaning Up
Article 38 (1)(c) of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, in TOWARDS AN
INTERNATIONAL LAW OF CO-PROGRESSIVENESS 21-35 (2014).
228
For more information on how the standard of civilized nations was
employed to exclude non-Western nations from participating in international
society, see generally Liliana O. Tarazona, The Civilized and the Uncivilized, in THE
OXFORD HANDBOOK OF THE HISTORY OF INTERNATIONAL LAW 917, 938 (Bardo
Fassbender & Anne Peters eds., 2012) (“In the 19th century, civilization became the
new a priori claim to European expansion based on an accepted way to classify the
progress of peoples or States through a range of imagined values.”); Brett Bowden,
The Colonial Origins of International Law. European Expansion and the Classical Standard
of Civilization, 7 J. HIST. INT'L L. 1 (2005); Antony Anghie, Finding the Peripheries:
Sovereignty and Colonialism in Nineteenth-Century International Law, 40 HARV. INT'L
L.J. 1 (1999) (focusing on the role of positivism in dispossessing European colonies);
Georg Schwarzenberger, The Standard of Civilisation in International Law, 8 CURRENT
LEGAL PROBS. 212 (1955); Edward Keene, The Standard of ‘Civilisation’, the Expansion
Thesis and the 19th-century International Social Space, 42 MILLENNIUM J. INT'L STUD. 651
(2014); Alexander Orakhelashvili, The Idea of European International Law, 17 EUR. J.
INT'L L. 315 (2006).
229
In his article, Spitra adopts the Third World Approach to International Law
to discuss the relations between the idea of civilization in international law and the
historical development of the protection of cultural property during warfare. See
Sebastian Spitra, Civilisation, Protection, Restitution: A Critical History of International
Cultural Heritage Law in the 19th and 20th Century, 22 J. HIST. INT’L L. 329 (2020).
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non-Western nations from applying the law of war during the
nineteenth century.
i.

The Concept of Civilized Nations Under Natural Law

The term “civilized nations” was not an innovation of the
nineteenth century but was written into the language of the law of
nations during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. 230 The
standard of civilized nations first referred to Christianity during the
seventeenth century, but was later developed toward the use of
reason due to the impact of the Enlightenment era during the
eighteenth century.231 As Wolff defined, a civilized nation was “a
cultured nation which cultivates intellectual virtues . . . . has
civilized usages or usages which conform to the standard of reason
and politeness.” 232 In this respect, Wolff recognized China as a
civilized nation because of its great achievements in moral
philosophy and statecraft, despite its slower development in physics
and mathematics than that of Europe.233
Remarkably, classical international law writers did not regard
the standard of civilized nations as a legal threshold to exclude nonWestern nations from applying the law of nations. Grotius
recognized the different progress of civilization in different peoples
but observed a universal application of international law to all
nations. 234 Wolff argued that all nations were equal by nature,
regardless of their different rates of progress as civilizations.235 The
equality of all nations was also long recognized as a fundamental

230
See, e.g., 2 GROTIUS, supra note 88, at 208 (“Hence this type of ownership,
which by common acceptation of civilized nations has been introduced in favour of
infants and those of similar condition”); WOLFF, supra note 58, at 17, 33.
231
See Tarazona, supra note 228, at 918–21.
232
2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 34.
233
See id. at 35.
234
HUGO GROTIUS, THE FREEDOM OF THE SEAS OR THE RIGHT WHICH BELONGS TO
THE DUTCH TO TAKE PART IN THE EAST INDIAN TRADE 5 (Ralph van Deman Magoffin
trans., James Brown. Scott ed., 1916). (“For it is a law derived from nature, the
common mother of us all, whose bounty falls on all, and whose sway extends over
those who rule nations, and which is held most sacred by those who are most
scrupulously just.”).
235
See 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 33-34.
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principle in the law of nations since the Peace of Westphalia of
1648.236
In these writers’ views, the standard of civilized nations was not
deemed an entrance to deny non-Western nations access to
international society, either. According to Wolff, an international
society was established among all nations and bound all nations by
nature.237 De Vattel likewise viewed that a great society of nations
was established by nature among all nations for “the interchange of
mutual assistance for their own improvement, and that of their
condition.”238
In light of this history, the standard of civilized nations was
neither an entrance for non-Western nations joining in international
society nor a threshold that excluded these nations from applying
the law of war under natural law during the seventeenth and
eighteenth centuries.
ii.

The Changing Legal Significance of Civilized Nations in the
Nineteenth Century

Only beginning in the nineteenth century, “civilized nations,” a
term which exclusively referred to those nations that inherited or
adopted European or Christian civilization, became a threshold to
exclude non-Western nations from membership in international
society.239 Since then, many non-European nations, such as China,
were labeled as uncivilized nations.240 A controversy arose among

236
Origins of Public International Law, in THE OXFORD INTERNATIONAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF LEGAL HISTORY (Stanley N. Katz ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009),
https://www.oxfordreference.com [https://perma.cc/45DF-3TAS] (last visited
Apr. 13, 2021).
237
See 2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 11.
238
DE VATTEL, supra note 64, at §12 (emphasis added).
239
See, e.g., FEDOR F. MARTENS, VÖLKERRECHT [INTERNATIONAL LAW] 474-75,
480-81 (Berlin, Weidmannache Buchhandlung 1883); TWISS, supra note 176, at 162;
WILLIAM E. HALL, A TREATISE ON INTERNATIONAL LAW 42-43 (3d ed. 1890); WHEATON
& PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 18. For contemporary comments, see also Tarazona,
supra note 228; Bowden, supra note 228, at 1.
240
See WHEATMAN & PHILLIPSON, supra note 69, at 20. However, Westlake
argued that countries such as China, Japan, and Turkey must be recognized as
civilized nations, even though their civilizations were different from European
models. See THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL
LAW 102-03 (L. Oppenheim ed., 1914).
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jurists at that time as to whether the law of war could apply to
uncivilized nations.241
However, what was the legal significance of the membership of
international community during this period? What was the
relationship between the membership of international community
and the subjects of international law? Indeed, non-membership of
international society did not necessarily deprive non-Western
nations of the subjects of international law, because this membership
was merely an expression of international law-making power
during this period. Prominent jurists, such as John Westlake and
Theodore D. Woolsey, argued that law-making power was limited
to nations that had inherited or adopted Western civilization. 242
Their ideas of limiting law-making power to civilized nations were
likely affected by Wolff, who admitted that “what has been
approved by the more civilized nations is the law of nations.” 243
Still, what Wolff meant in his time was that civilized nations had a
greater capacity to produce the rules for the law of nations, but all
nations were equal in the application of these rules.
Indeed, lack of law-making power did not necessarily exclude
non-Western nations from applying the law of nations. For
example, during the parliamentary debate of Great Britain in 1840,
a debate existed as to whether the law of nations should be applied
to relations between Great Britain and China in the Opium War.244
As Sir G. Staunton claimed, “Though the Chinese are no parties to
the specific usages of international law amongst European nations,
they cannot but be bound by that law of nations, which is founded
241
Some jurists argued that international law only applied to civilized nations
because it was an ultimate product of their civilization. See WHEATON & PHILLIPSON,
supra note 69, at 14-15; LORIMER, supra note 99, at 102 (“[Civilized communities are
not] bound to apply the positive law of nations to savages, or even to barbarians”);
HALL, supra note 239. However, a few scholars, such as Johann C. Bluntschli, have
argued that international law was not restricted to the European family of nations
but applied to all peoples on earth. JOHANN C. BLUNTSCHLI, DAS MODERNE
VÖLKERRECHT DER CIVILISIRTEN STATEN [THE MODERN INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
CIVILIZED STATES] para. 7 (1878).
242
THE COLLECTED PAPERS OF JOHN WESTLAKE ON PUBLIC INTERNATIONAL LAW,
supra note 240, at 103; THEODORE D. WOOLSEY, INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW §5 (New York, Charles Scribner & Co. 1871); cf. Tarazona, supra
note 228, at 918 (“[O]nly ‘civilized’ nations could participate in the project of
international law.”)
243
2 WOLFF, supra note 58, at 17.
244
CORRECTED REPORT OF THE SPEECH OF SIR GEORGE STAUNTON, ON SIR JAMES
GRAHAM’S MOTION ON THE CHINA TRADE IN THE HOUSE OF COMMONS 11 (London,
Edmund Lloyd, Harley Street 1840).
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on the law of nature and of common-sense.”245 Regarding the same
issue, John Q. Adams, former U.S. Congressman and President,
stated in his public lecture in 1841 that the general and necessary
law of nations should definitely apply to the contest between Great
Britain and China, which was determined by the law of nature to
bind the relations between independent communities. 246 These
statements strongly suggest that the standard of civilized nations
was not a threshold in considering whether to apply the law of war
to non-Western nations, despite these nations’ different
civilizations, their exclusion from the process of defining the
positive law of nations, and even their lack of knowledge of
international law.
State practices of Britain and France during the two Opium Wars
also reflected these opinions. During the first Opium War, Queen
Victoria issued an order on April 4, 1840, requiring British courts of
admiralty to determine all the confiscations of any property in China
“the same according to the course of admiralty and the laws of
nations.”247 Likewise, during the Second Opium War, Great Britain
and France both issued decrees ordering their armies to comply with
the rules of maritime law under the Declaration of Paris of 1856.248
This Declaration contained a special provision that limited its
application only to “the Powers who have signed [the Declaration]
or shall accede to it.”249 Great Britain and France were both parties
to this Declaration while China was not. However, the rules of
maritime law under this Declaration were reflections of customary
law of nations at that time.250 The practices of Britain and France
clearly suggested that they believed that the customary law of
nations also applied to the relations between Western powers and
China, even though China was neither a member of their
international community nor a civilized state according to their
standard.
Rather than denying its application to non-Western nations, the
standard of civilized nations was indeed employed as a means to
Id.
John Q. Adams, Lecture on the War with China (Dec. 1841), in 11 THE
CHINESE REPOSITORY 274, 275–76 (1842).
247
War with China: Order in Council, Presented to Parliament by Her
Majesty’s Command (Apr. 4, 1840), in 9 THE CHINESE REPOSITORY 241, 244 (1840).
248
TWISS, supra note 176, at xxxi-xxxiii.
249
Id. at xxxi.
250
See id. at xxxii (noting that the Declaration of Paris was to be “less
burdensome to Neutrals”).
245
246
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promote the universal application of the law of war. As Wheaton
observed, adopting international usages and observing the law of
war were essential considerations to determine whether nonWestern nations met the standard of civilized nations.251 In other
words, non-Western nations had to apply the law of war if these
states attempted to join in the international community. In this
regard, the standard of civilized nations was a coercive means to
promote the universal application of the law of war through
recruiting new members of international society, rather than
denying the application of these rules to non-Western nations.
Furthermore, as the records show, Western powers sought to
apply the laws and customs of war to all nations when they codified
these rules during the late nineteenth century. Although fifteen of
the states that attended the Brussels Conference were from Europe,
the rules of warfare they recognized were intended to impose limits
on the actions of all nations, particularly those of major powers.252
Consequently, smaller states were interested in taking advantage of
this circumstance to protect their rights as well in the event of war.253
The two Hague Conferences aimed to define the laws and customs
of war that would apply to all nations. 254 The First Hague
Conference (1899) had twenty-six countries attending.255 It included
all major European powers, as well as the United States and Mexico
attending from North America, and China, Japan, Persia, Siam, and
Turkey attending from the Near and Far East.256 The Second Hague
Conference (1907) had forty-four countries attending.257 It included
all the participants of the First Hague Conference and seventeen
additional states from Central and South America. 258 The two
Hague conferences showed that nations with different civilizations
could meet and consent to the rules that apply to all nations. These
efforts clearly show that Western powers positively promoted the
WHEATON & PHLLIPSON, supra note 69, at 18-21.
MARTENS, supra note 126, at 105.
253
Id.
254
See THE HAGUE CONVENTIONS AND DECLARATIONS OF 1899 AND 1907, supra
note 128, at v.
255
Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), supra note 26, at 1; John Whiteclay
Chambers II, Hague Peace Conferences, OXFORD COMPANION TO AM. MIL. HIST. (Mar.
3,
2021),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences-and-law/politicalscience-and-government/international-organizations/hague-conferences
[https://perma.cc/SZM2-VE5N].
256
Hague Conventions (1899, 1907), supra note 26, at 1.
257
Id. at 3.
258
Id.
251
252
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universal application of the law of war instead of limiting its
application among themselves. Therefore, the standard of civilized
nations was adopted not as a legal threshold to prevent the law of
war from applying to non-Western nations, but rather as a criterion
to limit law-making powers to Western nations.
The law of war, admittedly, was not evenly applied to all nations
during the nineteenth century. Inconsistent state practices existed
in obeying the law of war, as Western powers plundered countless
cultural artifacts from non-Western nations during many colonial
wars, which give rise to the claims for restitution today. Indeed, the
law of war is criticized as always applied to Western states but never
evenly applied to non-Western states even nowadays.259 However,
such uneven application of the law of war reflects gaps between
what is the law and to what degree the law is followed and enforced.
Substantial non-conformity or non-enforcement of the CIL rule
against plunder may undermine the effectiveness of the rule, but
may not deny the existence of the rule. In this respect, the
confiscations of cultural artifacts by Western powers that were
contrary to the CIL rule against plunder, such as the looting of
China’s Old Summer Palace, should be considered violations of the
rule. Restitution of these looted artifacts to their countries of origin
thus serves as the most efficient means to strengthen the law
conformity and enforcement.
VI.

THE PASSAGE OF TIME AND THE CIL RIGHT TO
RESTITUTION

There exists skepticism as to whether the CIL right to restitution
would be extinguished due to the passage of time. 260 Invoking the
statutes of limitations on the restitution also raises this question.261
However, statutes of limitations are indeed irrelevant because
statues of this kind only apply within the scope of domestic law

See JAMES GATHII, WAR, COMMERCE AND INTERNATIONAL LAW chs. 2-3 (2011).
See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1901; Ognibene, supra note 4, at 625-28.
261
See Merryman, supra note 18, at 1901 (discussing how English court’s
application of statutes of limitations reduce the chance of the Greeks recovering
stolen properties); Paige S. Goodwin, Comment, Mapping the Limits of Repatriable
Cultural Heritage: A Case Study of Stolen Flemish Art in French Museums, 157 Univ. Pa.
L. Rev. 673, 695-96 (2008) (identifying statutes of limitations as possibly hindering
recovery of stolen properties).
259
260
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rather than public international law.262 As for the passage of time,
the evolution of the CIL against plunder and in favor of restitution
suggest that claims for restitution of cultural artifacts will not be
inhibited by the duration of over one and half centuries that have
passed since the removal of these artifacts.
This customary norm was first reflected in the practices of
restitution that followed Napoleon’s defeat. Napoleon plundered
cultural artifacts for nearly twenty years. The passage of two
decades did not bar restitution claims and actions of victim states.
This principle became more obvious in the peace treaties arising
from World War I, which included clauses to return cultural artifacts
plundered during the previous wars of the eighteenth century. Such
restitution clauses were not an occasional provision but became a
feature in many of the peace treaties following World War I. This
principle was also shown in the peace treaties arising from World
War II. These treaties included clauses providing for restitution of
looted cultural treasures not only removed during World War II but
also those plundered during the Napoleonic Wars nearly one
century prior. For instance, the peace treaty with Hungary of 1947
provided for the restitution of cultural treasures confiscated as a
consequence of Hungarian rule over certain territories prior to
1919.263 The Treaty of Peace with Italy also stipulated that “Italy
shall restore to Yugoslavia all objects of artistic, historical, scientific,
educational or religious character . . . as well as administrative
archives” which were removed as the result of the Italian occupation
between November 4, 1918, and March 2, 1924.264
Furthermore, state practices have frequently reaffirmed this
principle in recent years. For instance, in 2007, the Chilean
government returned almost 4000 books that had been looted by
Chilean soldiers during its war with Peru (1879-1883) to the National
Library of Peru.265 As Chilean Senator Alejandro Navarro declared,
the books were required to be returned to their legitimate owners

262
See Ashraf Ray Ibrahim, The Doctrine of Laches in International Law, 83 VA.
L. REV. 647, 648 (1997).
263
The Treaty of Peace with Hungary, supra note 208, at art. 11.
264
The Treaty of Peace with Italy, supra note 208, at art. 12.
265
Dan Collyns, Chile returns looted Peru books, BBC NEWS (Nov. 7, 2007, 10:56
GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/7082436.stm
[https://perma.cc/6AA4-UZZP].
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because they were products of looting. 266 Likewise, in 2014,
Argentina’s then President Cristina Fernandez de Kirchner returned
to Paraguay some furniture that had been confiscated by
Argentinean armies during the War of the Triple Alliance (18641870).267 As Argentina’s governor of Entre Ríos explained during his
visit to Paraguay with President Kirchner, “We are going to return
objects that were seized by the Miter government . . . as trophies of
war,” and “we undertook the task and the duty to return them to
the Paraguayan government . . . .”268 The two cases clearly reflect
the opinio juris that both Chile and Argentina believe that they are
under international obligations to return these artifacts to the
territories where they were removed as spoils of war, and their
admission that such an obligation will not be relieved due to the
passage of over one century.
In December 2018, U.S. Defense officials and the ambassador
returned three church bells to Philippine authorities.269 American
soldiers had carried these bells away from the Philippines as war
trophies in 1899-1902. 270 The United States also returned the San
Pedro bell, which was similarly looted, to the Philippines in 2016.271
According to retired U.S. Navy Capital Dennis Wright, the United
States has returned many bells confiscated as war trophies as a
consequence of different armed conflicts to Japan and Russia.272
In 2011, France returned to South Korea the unique collections
of Korean royal archives produced during the Joseon Dynasty,
which were seized by French armies during their invasion of Korea
in the nineteenth century. 273 France’s then President François

266
Chile/Perú: diplomacia de los libros, BBC NEWS (Mar. 30, 2007, 14:40 GMT),
http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/misc/newsid_6510000/6510819.stm
[https://perma.cc/533Q-KCSY].
267 Oficial: Cristina y Urribarri viajaron a Paraguay a devolver muebles [Official:
Cristina and Urribarri Traveled to Paraguay to Return Furniture], PERFIL (Aug. 12, 2014,
23:56),
http://www.perfil.com/noticias/politica/Oficial-Cristina-y-Urribarriviajaron-a-Paraguay-a-devolver-muebles-20140812-0054.phtml
[https://perma.cc/VWN6-KSAT].
268 Id. (quoting as translated by the author of this article)
269
McCarthy, supra note 23.
270
See Id.
271
Id.
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Id.
273
See Oegyujanggak Uigwe Finally Returns, NAT’L MUSEUM KOR. (Apr. 8, 2011),
https://www.museum.go.kr/site/eng/archive/united/9162
[https://perma.cc/YQW8-G9FE].
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Mitterrand first agreed to return these collections in 1993. 274
However, this decision could not be enforced because French law
prohibits state-owned cultural artifacts from being transferred
abroad.275 After seventeen years’ silence, former French President
Nicolas Sarkozy confirmed on November 12, 2010 that France would
return these collections.276 The rationale behind his agreement to
return the collections, however, is vague. As Sarkozy explained, “I
know that for Koreans, these documents are very much a part of
Korean heritage.”277 His statement sought to show sympathy and
avoided the important question of whether this return was made
due to an international obligation, moral duty, or merely as a
friendly gesture for diplomatic purposes. However, the French
government’s method of proceeding with the return seemed to be
based upon more than a sympathy. To avoid the potential violation
of the French law that prohibits such transfer, the French
government agreed that the return of Korean Royal archives took
the form of a five-year renewable loan, which would be
automatically renewed every five years. 278 This agreement thus
secured that the collections would permanently stay in Korea. The
National Museum of Korea and the National Library of France in
Paris then concluded an agreement to facilitate the return on March
16, 2011, and the 297 volumes of the royal archives were finally
returned all at once.279
Although President Sarkozy did not admit that France bore an
international obligation to return these collections, such obligation
cannot be denied under CIL that requires restitution to correct the
international wrongdoings when state armies or agencies
confiscated cultural artifacts as spoils of war. This CIL obligation to
restitution also explains why the French government was willing to
exploit a loophole in its law to provide the permanent loan of the
Korean royal archives, so that the restitution would not violate the
domestic law that would otherwise prohibit such transfer.

274
See Korea, France Clinch Deal on Return of Royal Archive, CHOSUN MEDIA
(Nov.
13,
2010,
08:58),
http://english.chosun.com/site/data/html_dir/2010/11/13/2010111300290.html
[https://perma.cc/VFQ3-EMLX].
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More recently, French lawmakers reached a unanimous vote in
October 2020 to return twenty-six prized artifacts preserved
currently at the Quai Branly Museum in Paris to Benin. 280 These
artifacts once were plundered during the 1892 pillaging of the palace
of Abomey in Dahomey, and Benin is expected to receive these
artifacts within a year since this vote.281
The customary norm regarding duration in terms of restitution
of cultural artifacts removed during international warfare strongly
suggests that the passage of over one and a half centuries does not
bar the right to restitution. This customary norm is significant today,
because in many cases, the looting occurred well over a century
ago.282 Establishing this customary norm thus provides a firm legal
ground for states claiming restitution today.
VII.

LIMITATIONS TO THE RIGHT TO RESTITUTION

As previously analyzed, countries of origin have the right to the
restitution of cultural artifacts removed as spoils of war in
nineteenth-century warfare. However, does this right mean that
every piece of plundered artifacts must be returned? This Part
considers the limitations to enforce restitution, which require that
the objects for restitution still exist and are identifiable, with a
practical consideration of necessity that should be determined by
claiming states.

280
Benin feels ‘heard’ after France votes to return artefacts, MSN (Oct. 8, 2020),
[https://perma.cc/7GJL-FKB4].
281 Id.
282 See supra text accompanying notes, 5-13; see, e.g., Constanze Letsch & Kate
Connolly, Turkey wages “cultural war” in pursuit of its archaeological treasures, THE
GUARDIAN
(Jan.
21,
2013,
14:15
EST),
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/jan/21/turkey-cultural-wararchaeological-treasure [https://perma.cc/T2QS-VHMU]; Charlotte Edwardes &
Catherine Milner, Egypt demands return of the Rosetta Stone, TELEGRAPH (July 20, 2003,
00:01AM),
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/worldnews/africaandindianocean/egypt/14
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Return of Displaced Cultural Property from Abroad, JIKJI,
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a. The Requirement that the Objects Still Exist and Are Identifiable
The requirement that the objects still exist is the prerequisite to
enforcing restitution. According to Article 35(a) of Articles on State
Responsibility, a situation in which the objects for restitution are
“materially impossible” to return can preclude the obligation to
restitution.283 The rationale is clear. One cannot return property that
physically no longer exists. This situation arose when France was
asked to return plundered artifacts after Napoleon’s defeat;
however, many cultural properties were already ruined by the time
that the allied powers claimed their right of restitution.284
The principle of identification marks another limitation to
restitution, requiring that cultural artifacts for restitution have to be
identified as those that were in fact plundered from the territory of
removal; otherwise, it is impossible to restore the former
possession. 285 In the case of Napoleon’s restitution, it was
impractical for victim states to recover all their lost cultural artifacts
because many of these artifacts could not be found. First, there was
no written record stating what had been plundered from other
European nations or what had been stored in French museums.286
Therefore, states took mostly what was easily demonstrably
theirs. 287 Furthermore, many of Napoleon’s plundered artifacts
were first stored in Paris museums, but then were secretly
transferred to provincial churches and museums to avoid being
discovered during the peace negotiations. 288
Without any
comprehensive records, such concealment made it very difficult for
claiming states to track down lost treasures.
b. Necessity of Restitution
It is sometimes not necessary for countries of origin to recover
all pieces of plundered artifacts for practical considerations, such as

283
284
285
286
287
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Rep. on the Work of its Fifty-Third Session, supra note 42, art. 35(a),
See Sandholtz, supra note 156, at 152.
See KOWALSKI, supra note 3, at 46-47, 50.
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the cost of transportation or convenience.289 The goal is usually to
regain lost cultural property that is truly significant to the cultural
heritage of a nation. For instance, in the looting of China’s Old
Summer Palace case, it has been estimated that over one and a half
million artifacts were plundered by the joint British and French
armies in 1860. 290 Would the Chinese government expect a full
restitution, even if these pieces were all discovered one day? The
pieces most important to recover would be the unique and
irreplaceable artifacts, such as the series of copper zodiac animal
heads removed from a main fountain, which constituted a special
feature of the Old Summer Palace architecture. 291 Likewise,
countless cultural properties were looted by British armies from
India during the nineteenth century, and it would be difficult, if not
impossible, to recover them all. Among these spoils of war, the
Kohinoor diamond is of special importance to India not merely as a
piece of jewelry, but also because of its associations with Indian
kings over hundreds of years.292 The unique symbolic meaning that
the Kohinoor diamond represents in the history of ancient Indian
civilization makes this diamond irreplaceable to Indian cultural
heritage.
Restitution in this context thus does not merely mean a complete
restoration of the situation to the status quo ante in order to seek
justice, but it combines with a consideration of necessity. In this
sense, it is reasonable to conclude that countries of origin have the
right to receive full restitution limited by necessity as a practical
consideration. Moreover, which items are ultimately included in the
inventories of restitution should be determined by countries of
origin, since they have the best judgment of the value of various
artifacts to their cultural legacy.

289
See TREUE, supra note 3, at 198 (noting that Austrians exchanged a large
painting for a smaller one, since the latter was easier to dispatch, and the Florentines
abandoned twenty-nine paintings to the Louvre due to the probable cost of
transport).
290
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to Sell the China’s Old Summer Palace Plunders, supra note 11.
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The series of copper zodiac animal heads removed from China’s Old
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decades. See Bowlby, supra note 13.
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See Saby Ghoshray, Repatriation of the Kohinoor Diamond: Expanding the Legal
Paradigm for Cultural Heritage, 31 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 741, 746–48 (2008).
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CONCLUSION

Throughout the nineteenth century until the present, the CIL law
of war has prohibited the looting of cultural property and required
restitution as the primary form of reparations for such violations.
The CIL rule against plunder was established in the laws and
customs of war under natural law jurisprudence at the end of the
eighteenth century. This rule remained valid throughout the
nineteenth century, even though the philosophy of international law
changed from natural law toward positivism. It was further
developed during the twentieth century and finally led to the 1954
Hague Convention as well as its protocols.
The CIL right to restitution is based on the first-tier international
obligation that prohibits the plunder of cultural property during
wartime.
During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
restitution was deemed to be the legal remedy when the capture of
property was made contrary to the law of war. Acts of restitution
that occurred after Napoleon’s time and the two World Wars
consistently reflect that restitution serves as the primary remedy for
violations of the law of war against plunder.
The evolution of the CIL rules that prohibit the looting of
cultural property and require restitution shows that these rules were
not merely European customs, but rather general CILs that should
apply to all nations. The so-called standard of civilized nations was
merely a means to limit law-making powers to Western nations,
rather than to deny the application of the law of war to other nonEuropean nations during the nineteenth century. Moreover, even
the passage of over one and a half centuries since the removal of
cultural artifacts does not inhibit claims for restitution. The CIL
right to restitution require that plundered artifacts still exist and are
identifiable, otherwise this right could not be enforced. Claiming
states have the right to determine the necessity of restitution as a
practical consideration.
These arguments strongly rebut the presumptions that there
were no rules in the law of war during the nineteenth century that
regulated military practices in respect of cultural artifacts, and there
is no basis in international law today for claiming restitution. This
article thus provides an original interpretation of CIL-making in the
law of war that prohibits looting cultural property, paving the legal
grounds for claiming historically looted cultural property today.
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Applying these conclusions to current disputes would ultimately
transform the current debates about restitution and retention.
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